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aBstract
The major aim of this article is to analyse the concept of revolution and changes with-
in the theory of revolution. Theorising about radical social changes raised questions which 
still have not been answered: how is revolution different from other social changes? Does 
it have the beginning and the end? Is it a result of chance or a necessity? Why does it take 
place at a particular time, in a given place? How does it evolve? These basic problems are 
still the subject of study today. 
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‘It isn’t the events themselves that disturb people, 
but only their judgements about them’. 
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1.1.  INTRODUCTORy REMARKS
Theory, as most of the terms related to scholarly studies, has its source 
in the cradle of the modern political thought, i.e. Greece. The word itself 
comes from the Greek Θεωρία. Scientists aim at constructing hypotheses 
and theoretical systems (mostly on the ground of empirical studies), and 
then empirically test them with the use of observation and experiments1. 
A lot of printing ink has been used to describe what theory is. Generally, 
a scientific theory is a logical structure, constructed from the formulated 
laws of nature, facts (results of experiments and observation) and 
hypotheses. There is no doubt that science views the world through the 
prism of theory2. The research practice of a historian seems to depart from 
this pattern. Historians’ scope of activity is limited since their subjects of 
study are not to be accessed directly. Historians, before they create their 
own historical narration, should ponder on Albert Einstein’s words: 
‘Whether you can observe a thing or not depends on the theory which you 
use. It is the theory which decides what can be observed’3.
Extrapolating these words to the studies of the past, we can see that 
the matter brought up by one of the greatest minds of the 20th century 
relies on the importance of the ancient theory in the process of historical 
understanding. The theory itself sets the limits of this understanding 
and its subject of study. It is a springboard serving to widen the scope 
of vision. Have historians forgotten about the importance of theory? 
Definitely not. It was Herodotus and Thucydides who first paid tribute 
to theory in the service of Clio. History has gone a long way from the 
classical history, through history as a social or Marxist science, to the 
understanding of history as a field which is not scientific4. Owing 
to many various factors, the 1960s and 1970s5 witnessed a scientific 
reflection over history, i.e. the birth of methodology of history and 
history of historiography. The role of theory and its place in the work 
1 K. Popper, Logika poznania naukowego, Warszawa 2002, p. 21.
2 M. Heller, Filozofia nauki, Kraków 2016, p. 75.
3 ‘To czy jesteś w stanie coś zaobserwować czy nie, zależy od teorii, którą się 
posługujesz. To teoria decyduje, co można obserwować’. After: E. Carr, Historia. Czym jest, 
Poznań 2002, p. 202.
4 See: G.G. Iggers, Historiografia XX wieku. Przegląd kierunków badawczych, Warszawa 
2010; A.F. Grabski, Kształty historii, Łódź 1985.
5 Poland witnessed a development of the so-called ‘Poznań school’ in the 1970s. 
It centered around Jerzy Topolski, Jerzy Kmita, Leszek Nowak, and Andrzej Malewski. 
They claimed that the role of history is to explain the past. See: Między historią a teorią. 
Refleksje nad problematyką dziejów i wiedzy historycznej, ed. M. Drozdowski, Warszawa–
Poznań 1988.
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of historians are still terra incognita for many6. Jerzy Topolski believed 
that ‘[…] of primary importance for the world with history is the level 
of historic science, its ability to show the past reality, despite of a limited 
access to it, and being on one’s own with its sources. A question is raised 
– Topolski added – how does a historian reconstruct their view of the 
past?’7. Topolski answered the question himself, similarly to philosophers 
such as Otto Neurath and Willar van Orman Quine, stating: ‘The constant 
writing of history anew can be compared to the act of rebuilding a ship 
at sea, [which] is sailing […] with its passengers on the rough waves of 
events. A historian is not only an observer but also an agent participating 
in the events. […] This fact has twofold consequences: it can positively 
influence the acuity of vision but can also deform the observation’8. 
Topolski’s views refer directly to the significance of self-awareness in the 
field of historical theory. Adopting the suggestion by Marceli Handelsman 
as of the year 1928, ‘[…] history – today and in the past – imposing a duty 
of omniscience on a historian, should in fact be poly-history, in line with 
its original name’9. Initially, the term history ‘equaled knowledge in 
general’10. A bit later, in 1938, Maurice Mandelbaum delineated the subject 
of methodology of history, together with its objectives11. The models of 
historical studies12, which were established in the 20th century in contrast 
to the previously accepted historicism, enriched the scientific knowledge 
6 J. Pomorski, Historyk i metodologia, Lublin 1991, p. 10.
7 ‘[…] pierwszorzędne znaczenie dla świata z historią ma poziom nauki historycznej, 
jej zdolność do ukazywania przeszłej rzeczywistości, mimo stracenia z nią kontaktu 
i pozostania sam na sam ze źródłami. Powstaje pytanie – dedukował Topolski – Jak 
historyk konstruuje swój obraz przeszłości?’. J. Topolski, Świat bez historii, Poznań 1998, 
pp. 173–175.
8 ‘Stałe pisanie historii na nowo przyrównujemy do przebudowywania okrętu na 
pełnym morzu, [który] płynie […] wraz ze wszystkimi na wzburzonych falach zdarzeń. 
Jest nie tylko ich obserwatorem, lecz również współtwórcą nieobojętnym na bieg rzeczy. 
[…] Fakt, iż historyk jest równocześnie obserwatorem i uczestnikiem życia społecznego, 
prowadzi do dwojakich skutków: może wpływać pozytywnie na ostrość jego widzenia, 
może jednak także obserwację tę deformować’. Ibidem, pp. 174–175.
9 ‘[…] historja – w zasadzie dziś jak i dawniej – nakładając na historyka obowiązek 
wszechwiedzy, winna być polihistorją, zgodnie ze swą nazwą pierwotną’. M. Handelsman, 
Historyka. Zasady metodologji i teorji poznania historycznego. Podręcznik dla szkół wyższych, 
Warszawa–Kraków–Lublin–Łódź–Paryż–Poznań–Wilno–Zakopane 1928, p. 34.
10 ‘równało się wiedzy w ogóle’. Ibidem, p. 1.
11 See: M. Mandelbaum, The Problem of Historical Knowledge, New York 1938.
12 Models of historical studies, i.e. constructions of the optimal development that 
was reached at a given moment of time by historiography, are the major subjects of 
study for methodology of history, together with social awareness and rules guiding the 
study practice. See: J. Pomorski, op. cit., pp. 27–30; See: M. Handelsman, op. cit., p. 74–76; 
J. Topolski, Teoria wiedzy historycznej, Poznań 1983, pp. 56–57, 130–138, 256.
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of the past. The thought, expressed by the theory, should precede 
a scientific understanding. This pointed Marc Bloch to the observation 
that ‘[…] each historical study assumes that, starting with its early stages, 
the research will have a clearly marked direction. Thought comes first. 
Sheer observation, if possible at all, has never brought any effects in any 
science’13.
In light of the abovementioned opinions regarding the importance 
of theory for history, it seems justified to treat a historian as a fisher or 
a detective, who creates a network of hypotheses or criminal plots14, 
which, when falsified, would lead to a gradual discovery (constantly 
anew) or a construal of the past. This idea was aptly expressed by Novalis, 
who at the end of the 18th century stated that ‘[…] hypotheses are nets: 
only those who throw them can catch something’15. A collective effort 
of generations of scientists, a growing awareness of the limitations that 
come with a particular scientific discipline as well as recognition of the 
importance of theory, enable a historian to catch grains of truth in the 
vastness of cognizable reality. 
In the 1960s, Robert Merton wrote On the Shoulders of Giants16. The title 
refers to a metaphor which was used by Isaac Newton and a medieval monk, 
Bernard of Chartres. Scientists are compared to dwarves on the shoulders 
of giants, who can see further than the giants themselves from that vantage 
point17. The giants are the great minds, wise people who left a heritage of 
thoughts and ideas. The breadth of the horizon of studies depends on the 
heritage that blazed the trail for the understanding of the reality.
13 ‘[…] każde badanie historyczne zakłada, że poczynając już od pierwszych kroków, 
poszukiwania mieć będą wytknięty kierunek. Na początku jest myśl. Nigdy w żadnej 
nauce bierna obserwacja – nawet gdybyśmy przyjęli, że taka jest możliwa – nie wydała 
owoców’. M. Bloch, Pochwała historii, Warszawa 1964, p. 89.
14 I refer to the creation of criminal versions in accordance to the principle of multiple 
versions. A criminal version, according to Tadeusz Hanausek, is the result of cognitive 
processes in the form of assumptions, serving as hypotheses to explain an event, its causes, 
circumstances and course. What is highlighted here is the necessity of an alternative 
character of the version, which assumes that each version assumes one of many possibilities. 
See: T. Hanausek, Kryminalistyka. Zarys wykładu, Kraków 2009, pp. 79–82. Similar concepts 
of hypothetical thinking were proposed by William of Baskerville in Umberto Eco’s novel. 
William, not having any answer, ‘[…] relied on many differing possibilities’. He states that 
those who have ready-made answers to all questions are bound to be mistaken. William 
accepts the eventual mistakes, because ‘[…] instead of conceiving only one, I imagine 
many, so I become the slave of none’. See: U. Eco, The Name of the Rose, Warszawa 2013, 
pp. 432–434.
15 ‘[…] hipotezy są sieciami: tylko ten kto je zarzuca coś złowi’. The motto by Karl 
Popper, adopted from the German poet of 18th century, Novalis. K. Popper, op. cit., p. 5.
16 See: R. Merton, On the Shoulders of Giants, New York 1965.
17 P. Sztompka, Teoria przestrzeni międzyludzkiej, Kraków 2016, pp. 33–34.
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The abovementioned scientists, Einstein and Merton, followed 
different scientific paths and expressed an extremely important thought in 
a separate way, namely, that it is the development of theoretical concepts 
that stimulates an understanding of the reality, whether the past, present 
(or the future one). A good example is Descartes, who developed the 
concept of the mind, which has shaped the way we understand the mind 
today. Descartes’ vision of the mind consists of three theses: the mind is 
distinct from the body; the mind is distinct from other minds; the mind, in 
which perception precedes will (action)18.
The three dogmas, having been gradually falsified by new theories 
(today, mostly neurobiological ones) and empirical studies conducted 
by new generations of scientists led to an almost opposite vision of the 
mind19. Today, the mind is conceptualised along three categories: as the 
embodied mind, the action-oriented mind and the social mind20.
The first notion which I would like to analyse in this article are the 
semantic changes of the term revolution21. I analyse how the concept of 
a problem situation (the term used by Karl Popper) evolved throughout 
the periods of time, starting in the antiquity and ending at the modern 
times. I reconstruct the process of change based on the semantic evolution 
of the term and a theoretical reflection. Such a change is epitomised by 
Charles Tilly, who made an allegorical distinction between a solar eclipse 
18 Descartes, Listy do Regiusa. Uwagi o pewnym pisemku, Warszawa 1996, p. 29; idem, 
Zasady filozofii, Kęty 2001, pp. 38–43; idem, Medytacje o pierwszej filozofii, Kraków 2004, 
pp. 46, 73, 93.
19 Theory falsifiability is, according to Popper, in a narrow understanding, a criterion 
of empirical character determining whether a given theoretical system belongs to empirical 
sciences. Popper wrote: ‘Falsyfikowalność proponuję tutaj jako kryterium demarkacji. […] 
Falsyfikowalność przeprowadza podział pomiędzy dwoma rodzajami zdań najzupełniej 
sensownych: zdaniami falsyfikowanymi i niefalsyfikowanymi. Wyznacza się w ten sposób 
granicę w obrębie wyrażeń sensownych, a nie granicę języka sensownego’ [‘I propose 
falsifiability as the demarcation criterion. […] Falsifiability makes a distinction between two 
types of most sensical sentences: falsifiable and non-falsifiable. Hence a border is made in the 
sensical expressions and not in the sensical language’]. See: K. Popper, op. cit., pp. 35, 73, 81.
20 B. Brożek, Hipoteza umysłu normatywnego, ‘Studia z Kognitywistyki i Filozofii 
Umysłu’ 2013, 7, pp. 37–40; idem, Myślenie. Podręcznik użytkownika, Kraków 2016, pp. 9–46; 
neuroscience and history. See: J. Pomorski, Polityzacja/Mitologizacja historii, czyli w czym 
neuronauka (i metodologia) może pomóc badaczowi historii najnowszej, ‘Historia@Teoria’ 2017, 4.
21 It seems that equally suitable would be the use of the term ‘concept migration’ by 
Michał Heller. It denotes absorption of certain concepts by various scientific disciplines. 
‘Concept migration’ is multi-directional, complex and shows that scientific disciplines, 
despite various objects of study, influence each other in a multidimensional way. Definitions 
and concepts were originally of a philosophical character, and then, being transferred into 
natural sciences, left a mark on human knowledge. See: M. Heller, Granice nauki, Kraków 
2014; idem, Bóg i geometria. Gdy przestrzeń była Bogiem, Kraków 2016.
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and a traffic jam. The metaphor symbolically shows a transition from 
an astronomical thinking about revolution to multidimensional theories 
and models. Initially, revolution was understood as a cyclic event which 
takes place in certain, clearly defined astronomical conditions, just like 
a solar eclipse. Today, revolutionary changes in the social sphere resemble 
traffic jams, with their specific, repeating, causal mechanisms. Traffic jams 
differ in sizes and causes, it is quite difficult to determine their beginnings 
and ends since they emerge from various conditions and circumstances. 
A thesis on the randomness of their origin would be easy to be put forward 
and defended, however, it is possible to point towards certain conditions 
that lead to traffic jams. These could be, for example, weather, rush hour, 
road conditions, black spots on the road. Factors leading to traffic jams 
may be complex and look as if a given traffic jam was a result of chance. 
We may be talking about a cluster of factors, or even direct and indirect 
factors. Similarly, revolutions cannot be grouped under one theory that 
would specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a revolution to 
take place or these determining its course and consequences22. 
This article aims to show the concept of revolution in a wider and 
multi-dimensional context. In the analysis of semantic contexts I referred 
to the history of concepts, originating in the 1950s23, developed by Reinhart 
Koselleck, the author of the Bielefeld school of historiography. According 
to Koselleck, the history of concepts is ‘historical scientific studies, which 
do not treat language as an epiphenomenon of the so-called reality (‘Being 
determines consciousness’ – Karl Marx) but treat it as a methodologically 
non-reducible last resort, without whom neither experience, nor studies 
about the world or society are possible’24. This methodology is aimed at 
showing how, in the context of revolution, changes in the perception of time 
‘revolutionised’ the meaning of the term (semantic evolution), beginning 
from the ancient cycle and circularity to the linear experiencing of time 
and the idea of a new beginning. Then particular features of revolution 
are presented. 
22 C. Tilly, Rewolucje europejskie 1492–1992, Warszawa 1997, pp. 18–19.
23 Richard Koebner was the first to demonstrate how words and actions interact and 
influence each other. See: R. Koebner, Semantics and Historiography, ‘Cambridge Journal’ 
1953, 7, pp. 131–144.
24 ‘[…] nazywa się historyczne badania naukowe, które nie traktują języka jako 
epifenomenu tak zwanej rzeczywistości (‘Byt określa świadomość’ – Karol Marks), 
lecz pojmują go jako metodycznie nieredukowalną ostateczną instancję, bez której ani 
doświadczenie, ani nauka o świecie lub społeczeństwie nie są możliwe’. R. Koselleck, 
Dzieje pojęć. Studia z semantyki i pragmatyki języka społeczno-politycznego, Warszawa 2009, 
p. 103.
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A theoretical reflection over revolution began together with the story25 
of the French revolution. I tried to sketch the birth of the theory and present 
the main paradigms of theorising on the phenomenon predominant from 
the 19th to the 21st century. There are many typologies of theoretical 
reflection on revolution. Starting from the 1980s, the most famous attempt 
at its systematisation was the one by Jack A. Goldstone26, who distinguished 
between three generations of researchers inquiring into the phenomenon. 
The first group were authors of the period between 1900 and 1940, such as 
Gustav Le Bon, Charles Ellwood, Pitrim Sorokin, Lyford Edwards, Crane 
Brinton and George Petee. They did not lay the theoretical foundations for 
their studies but rather took a descriptive approach towards revolution. 
Theoreticians of the second generation put forward their concepts in the 
time from 1940 to 1970. These were James Davies, Ted Gurr, Chalmers 
Johnson, Neil Smelser, Samuel Huntington and Charles Tilly. They offered 
comprehensive analyses of an interdisciplinary character as they relied on 
theories from the political, psychological, and social sciences, and developed 
them for the sake of their studies. The group of third-generation scholars is 
rooted in the second half of the 1970s. Its main representatives were Theda 
Skocpol, Jeffrey Paige, Ellen Trimberger and Shmuel Eisenstadt. They 
advanced previous theories by emphasizing the role of the state, international 
affairs, as well as the significance of army and peasant community in the 
process of revolution. Goldstone’s typology gained recognition in the 
scientific circles due to its transparent systematisation. It also brought 
attention to the creation of the fourth generation of theoreticians27 at the 
end of 20th century. The concepts put forward by John Foran, Eric Selbin, 
Jack Goldstone, Jeff Goodwin, Timothy Wickham-Crowley, John Walton 
and Farideh Farhi are characterised by their distinctness from the previous 
theories. Their thought emphasize the issues of subjectivity, composition of 
revolution, coalition and political culture28.
25 Storytelling as an effective tool of studying revolution is proposed by Eric Selbin. 
He describes it ‘[…] as a new approach which focuses on the thoughts and feelings of 
people engaged in a revolutionary process’. See: E. Selbin, Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance: 
The Power of Story, Londyn 2010 p. 4.
26 Goldstone presented his typology in two articles published in the 1980s. See: 
J.A. Goldstone, Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation, ‘World Politics’ 1980, 32, 
pp. 425–453; idem, The Comparative and Historical Study of Revolutions, ‘Annual Review of 
Sociology’ 1982, 8, pp. 187–207.
27 J. Foran, Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation?, ‘Sociological 
Theory’ 1993, 11, 1, pp. 1–20; E. Selbin, Revolution in the Real World: Bringing Agency Back In, 
in: Theorizing Revolutions, ed. J. Foran, London–New York 1997, pp. 123–136.
28 It is worth noting that revolution experts who base their studies on the theory of 
rational choice were completely ignored. The abovementioned system refers to these 
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Another classification was proposed by Stan Taylor, and was based 
on a disciplinary criterion29. He made a distinction between sociological 
(e.g. Barrington Moore, Skocpol), socio-psychological (e.g. Davies, Gurr), 
economic (e.g. Gordon Tullock, Morris Silver) and political theories (Tilly, 
Huntington). The distinction lacked in inclusiveness and referred only to 
the concepts developed in the 1960s and 1970s. Another typology of the 
theoretical thought on revolution was put forward by Quee-Young Kim30. 
With the use of the category of paradigm, he made a distinction between 
two major areas of research: ‘society-oriented paradigm’ (e.g. Johnson, 
Gurr) and ‘state-oriented paradigm’ (e.g. Skockpol)31.
In this article I rely on the conceptualisation of revolution similar 
to Jarosław Chodak’s, who made a radical change in the classification 
in terms of directions and ways of forming the models of revolution. 
Chodak’s typology is hinged ‘[…] mostly on the concepts representative 
of particular theoretical orientations’32, therefore it is rooted in ‘[…] 
identify[ing] the major research perspectives’33. Chodak lists the major 
currents in the theoretical reflection over revolution in a chronological 
order, spanning the period of 1848–2001, and beginning with classic 
works which deal with revolution on a macro scale, while studies inspired by the theory of 
rational choice aim at understanding revolution on a micro scale. Only recently, this trend, 
with a focus on agency, has gained popularity. Goldstone discovered this idea only in 2001. 
See: J.A. Goldstone, Toward A Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory, ‘Annual Review of 
Political Science’ 2001, 4, pp. 163–165.
29 Taylor, in contrast to Goldstone, does not omit theoretical reflections based on the 
theory of rational choice. See: S. Taylor, Social Science and Revolutions, London 1984. Piotr 
Sztompka refers to it in his work on social changes. See: P. Sztompka, Socjologia zmian 
społecznych, Kraków 2006, pp. 286–294.
30 Q. Kim, Paradigmas and Revolutions: The Societal and Statist Approach Reconsidered, 
‘Journal of Developing Societies’ 1990, 6, 1, pp. 1–16.
31 The abovementioned classifications do not exhaust the available conceptual 
divisions. An interesting idea was proposed by Rod Aya. He relied on a distinction of 
revolution on the basis of the criterion of the causes of a radical change. He distinguished 
between structural, political, psychological and functional theories. See: R. Aya, Theorie of 
Revolutions, in: International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, eds. N. Smelsera, 
P. Baltes’a, Amsterdam–New York 2001, pp. 13314–13317; A similar typology was offered 
by Krzysztof Brzechczyn, relying on the most important explanations of a given theory. 
He mentioned homogenous theories (cultural, political and economic) and mixed theories 
(economic-cultural, political-economic, political-economic-cultural). See: K. Brzechczyn, 
Rozwój teorii rewolucji w socjologii historyczno-porównawczej. Próba analizy metodologicznej, in: 
O rewolucji. Obrazy radykalnej zmiany społecznej, eds. K. Brzechczyn, M. Nowak, Poznań 
2007, pp. 37–64.
32 ‘[…] przede wszystkim na koncepcjach najbardziej reprezentatywnych dla 
poszczególnych orientacji teoretycznych’.
33 ‘[…] identyfikacja głównych perspektyw badawczych’. J. Chodak, Teorie rewolucji 
w naukach społecznych, Lublin 2012, pp. 11, 31.
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theories of revolution (Karl Marx, Plinio Correa de Oliveira, Alexis de 
Tocqueville, Gustave le Bon, Pitrim A. Sorokin), through the natural 
‘school’ of history of revolution (Brinton, Edwards, Petee), theories of 
revolution in the modernist perspective (Smelser, Huntington, Davies, 
Gurr, James Geschwender), revolution viewed from the point of historical 
sociology (Skockpol, Tilly, Paige, Wolf, Moore) and viewed from the 
perspective of theories of rational choice (Gordon Tullock, Samuel 
Popkin, Jeffrey Berejikian, Micheal Taylor), and finishes with currently 
developing multidimensional theories of revolution, i.e. the fourth 
generation of theoreticians (e.g. Goldstone, Farhi, Walton, Jeff Goodwin, 
Timothy Wickham-Crowley). I adopted a similar systematisation in my 
work; however, my work is closer to a sketch since I focus on the key 
representatives of given approaches. What is more, I concentrate on the 
understanding of revolution in the lusophone culture as a contrast to the 
American and European stance.
1.2. at the DaWN oF ‘revoLUtioN’
In 1543, after many years of preparation of the manuscript, De 
revolutionibus orbium coelestium was first printed in Nuremberg. The work 
of Nicolaus Copernicus offered an model of the universe, an alternative to 
Ptolemy's geocentric system, and became a synonym to the revolution in 
science34. This is reinforced by the term itself, revolutionibus, which denotes 
‘revolutions’, moving around in a cyclic way35. The Latin Revolutio36 is 
34 For scientific revolutions see: T.S. Kuhn, Struktura rewolucji naukowych, Warszawa 
2009; idem, Przewrót kopernikański: astronomia planetarna w dziejach myśli, Warszawa 1966; J. 
Życiński, Struktura rewolucji metanaukowej. Studium rozwoju współczesnej nauki, Kraków 2013.
35 J. Topolski, Jak się pisze i rozumie historię? Tajemnice narracji historycznej, Poznań 2008, 
p. 181.
36 Previously the term revolutio (or revolutus) was used by Ovid in the term revolutaseacula, 
which was used as a poetic metaphor, and also by Saint Augustine: ‘aut post multasitidem 
per diverse corpora revolutiones’, in a theological context. See: W. Wrzosek, Historia–Kultura–
Metafora. Powstanie nieklasycznej historiografii, Wrocław 1995, p. 39; In light of cognitive 
linguistics, conceptual metaphor is a way of thinking and entails mapping of elements from 
one conceptual domain onto another domain. For neuro-cognitive scientists, metaphor 
is ‘[…] zdolność pojmowania doświadczeń za pośrednictwem metafory jest kolejnym 
zmysłem, jak wzrok, dotyk czy słuch, a metafora dostarcza jedynego sposobu postrzegania 
i doświadczania znacznej części świata rzeczywistego. Metafora jest takim samym i równie 
cennym elementem naszego funkcjonowania jak zmysł dotyku’ [‘[…] an ability to understand 
experience […], another sense, just like sight, touch or hearing, metaphor provides another 
way of perceiving and experiencing a substantial part of the real world. Metaphor is the 
same and equally important element of human functioning, just as the sense of touch’]. See: 
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synonymous to rotation, reversion, return. The syllable re- entails an act 
of coming back to the initial stage. The term revolutio appears in French 
at the end of 12th century and up till the 17th century denotes an act of 
rotating or moving on the circular trajectory. The latter meaning is still 
to be found in English in the technical and astronomic jargon37. The 17th 
century witnessed the use of revolution in a political sense, which made 
it a term in the domain of political philosophy. The establishment of 
revolution as a scientific term, referring to the natural movement of celestial 
bodies, played a great role in further understanding of radical changes 
and revolution38. When the 17th century thinkers began using the term to 
describe social phenomena, it gained its physical-political meaning.
Since the advent of the 17th century’s meaning of revolution, with its 
political connotations, political systems were thought to change in terms 
of constant transformation. We can easily find correlations between 
revolution understood in such a way and the teachings of Plato, Aristotle, 
or Polybius. In line with the ancient thought, there is a limited number of 
political systems, which change one after another, only to come back to 
square one. The first, monarchy, ‘[…] we usually call kingdom, the rule of 
the few but more than one we call aristocracy, […] and when the people 
rule for the general good, we use the term politeia. […] Degenerations of the 
abovementioned political systems are: tyranny (in relation to kingdom), 
oligarchy (in relation to aristocracy), and democracy (in relation to 
politeia)’39. Aristotle’s thoughts on political systems were developed by 
Polibius in the 2nd century B.C.E. By observing the transitions of various 
forms of government, he adopted a theory of the cyclic development, 
inspired by Plato. Thus he combined the political thoughts of two great 
Greek philosophers, the essence of which was a vision of the state as 
a human organism, going through the stage of growth (proper systems, 
G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, Metafory w naszym życiu, Warszawa 2010, p. 305; For example, studies 
on memory are studies on metaphors (similarly to revolution studies) which described it. 
See: D. Draiaisma, Machina metafor. Historia pamięci, Warszawa 2009; Revolution, acquiring 
its metaphorical meaning, made sense in other areas of human life.
37 P. Sztompka, Socjologia, p. 280 (and footnote 1).
38 In the 1970s William Lipsky noted a great number of articles and monographs 
(about 250–300) connected with the concept of revolution. See: W.E. Lipsky, Comparative 
Approaches to the Study of Revolution: A Historiographic Essay, ‘Review of Politics’ 1976, 38, 
pp. 494–495.
39 ‘[…] zwykliśmy nazywać królestwem, panowanie niewielu, a więcej niż jednego, 
zwiemy arystokracją, […] kiedy zaś lud rządzi ku ogólnemu pożytkowi, używamy nazwy, 
którą w szerszym znaczeniu określamy wszystkie ustroje – politeja. […] Zwyrodnieniami 
wspomnianych ustrojów są: w stosunku do królestwa tyrania, w stosunku do arystokracji 
oligarchia, a w stosunku do politei demokracja’. Aristotle, Polityka, Warszawa 2011, p. 86.
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according to Aristotle), through the stage of fall (degenerated systems). 
These systems followed each other in the following order: tyranny replaces 
monarchy, then tyranny is overthrown by aristocracy, which is replaced 
by oligarchy, and oligarchy is replaced by democracy. It is a cyclic process 
when the individual stands at the lead of people’s rule40.
The 17th century theoreticians understood revolution as a natural 
change in political systems. Ancient sciences, derived from the ancient 
Greece, narrowed down the number of political systems, highlighting 
their finiteness. They also paid attention to the inevitability of change 
within the state organism. The aspect of naturalness of revolution was 
highlighted by Reinhart Koselleck, noting that ‘[…] any changes, rerum 
commutatio, rerum conversio, were not able to introduce anything new to 
the world of politics. Historical experience lasted, imprinted in the status 
quo, as if confirmed by nature, similarly to seasons, which despite their 
changing nature, are constant. By analogy, people as political beings have 
their hands tied by changes which bring nothing new under the sun’41. 
The double sense of revolution, i.e. a combination of an astronomical 
dimension, understood as a specific natural state, together with the idea of 
eternal comeback, a cyclic change of the political state, was already known 
in the 17th century. Koselleck defined the metaphor of identity between 
nature and revolution, as a historical time, closed and repeated with the 
same quality. In light of this historical experience all political systems 
remained under the influence of a trans-historical sense of revolution42. 
At this stage of reflection, we can clearly see a relationship between an 
understanding of a historical process and an understanding of the term 
revolution. It is possible to analyse the evolution of such a meaning43.
40 Andrzej Grabski, quoting A. Momigliano, noted a lack of consequence in Polybios’ 
referring to the ‘cyklicznego poglądu na dzieje’ [‘cyclic view of history’]. The Greek 
historian admitted the possibility of cyclic variability even though without a definite 
character. See: A. Grabski, Dzieje historiografii, Poznań 2003, p. 25.
41 ‘[…] wszelka zmiana spraw, rerum commutatio, rerum conversio, nie była w stanie 
wprowadzić czegoś zasadniczo nowego do świata polityki. Doświadczenie historyczne 
trwało, wbudowane w istniejący stan, jakby utwierdzony przez naturę, a podobnie jak 
pory roku w swej zmienności wciąż są takie same, tak i ludzie jako istoty polityczne mają 
ręce związane przemianami, które nie zdołają niczego nowego pod słońcem stworzyć’. 
R. Koselleck, Historyczne kryteria nowożytnego pojęcia rewolucji, in: Semantyka historyczna, 
Poznań 2012, p. 109.
42 Ibidem, pp. 110–111.
43 Another perspective is presented by Wojciech Wrzosek. The main thesis of his work 
presumes that the foundation of changes that took place in the 20th century historiography 
lies in a change of historiographic metaphors: from the classical to the non-classical 
ones. Metaphor is understood as a category of epistemological historiographic analysis. 
Metaphor ‘[…] może być rozumiana jako pojęcie retoryczne, literaturoznawcze, kategoria 
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The early modern political philosophy relied on the term revolution in its 
general sense – revolutio appears as a form of restoration or reconstruction 
of the old order and reflects the image of cyclic time44 of a natural and 
essential character. That is how Tomas Hobbes imagined the English 
revolution: ‘I have seen this revolution a circular motion’45. The events 
of 1640–1660, for an observer of that time, looked parallel to the cycles 
of change described in antiquity: from absolute monarchy to the Long 
parliament, through the Rump Parliament, to Cromwell’s dictatorship, 
and then through oligarchy to the restoration of monarchy. It is quite 
symptomatic that the first use of revolution as a political term dates back 
to 1660, i.e. the restoration of the Stuart monarchy. The same applies to 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It entailed a period of restoration and 
reconstruction. Hobbes used the term revolution purposefully to describe 
the event, which expressed not only a political change but also the whole 
process of power usurpation, which, once started, triggers inevitable 
stages of a model revolt46.
A variety of phenomena connected with fighting for power were 
characterised by a variety of names. Political conflicts of the 16th and 17th 
century in the Netherlands, Germany, France or England were labelled 
as uprisings, revolts, rebellions, uprisings, putsches, coup d’ états or civil 
wars. Some of them (especially civil wars), with time were renamed as 
revolutions in order to highlight the importance and momentousness of the 
events. Vagueness and ambiguity of the term revolution makes it possible 
to be used in reference to a variety of phenomena. Where is the semantic 
line between a civil war and a revolution? This dilemma can be explained 
by the specificity of the correlation between the two since the times of the 
poetyki, ale może być także postrzegana w kontekście, który czyni z niej kategorię 
epistemologiczną. […] Najogólniej biorąc, metafora i jej konteksty interpretacyjne wydają 
się stosowne zwłaszcza dla takiego myślenia o humanistyce, które sytuuje ją nie tyle i nie 
przede wszystkim w obrębie nauki, ile w obszarze kultury. Badania nad metaforą stwarzają 
szansę przezwyciężenia rozdarcia historiografii między nauką a literaturą, powstałego 
w czasach nowożytnych’ [‘[…] can be understood as a term related to rhetorics, literature 
studies, poetics but also in the context of an epistemological category. […] Generally, 
metaphor and its contexts, and its interpretation contexts seems to be suitable for the way 
of thinking about humanities not in the context of science but culture. Studies on metaphor 
create a chance to overcome the split of historiography between science and literature, 
created in modern times’]. Wrzosek tried to analyse revolution in terms of metaphor. See: 
W. Wrzosek, op. cit., pp. 26, 38–40, 44–45.
44 B. Uspienski, Historia i semiotyka, Gdańsk 1998, p. 134.
45 After: M. Hartman, Hobbes’s Concept of Political Revolution, ‘Journal of the History 
of Ideas’ (Philadelphia), July–September 1986, 47, 3, p. 487; See: T. Hobbes, Lewiatan czyli 
materia, forma i władza państwa kościelnego i świeckiego, Warszawa 2009, pp. 268–271.
46 M. Hartman, op. cit., p. 495.
reFLectioNs oN historiograPhy aND theory oF revoLUtioN 429
Doi: 10.17951/rh.2020.50.417-460
Enlightenment. A civil war had a character of a state rebellion, grounded 
in legal titles or religious status. Revolution was used as a metaphor of 
a sudden or long-lasting revolt. In this light, both terms, civil war and 
revolution, were not mutually exclusive47. Fighting for power came with 
the terms depending on their users. For those in power, any opposition 
was a conspiracy, rebellion, riot, coup d'état. For those fighting for their 
rights, their fight was an uprising, revolt or civil war. The vagueness of 
these terms and their random usage meant that there was no consolidated 
term for the phenomenon. A process of revolution, which would exceed 
the model of various forms of political power, was not known at that time. 
According to Hannah Arendt, up till the American and French Revolution, 
‘[…] even though in the pre-modern political language offered enough 
words to describe an uprising of the subordinate against those in power, 
there was not a single word describing a radical change through which the 
subordinate become those in power’48. 
It was only during the Enlightenment when the modern sense of 
revolution was established. First of all, the trend for using the term revolution 
began with the advent of the age of reason. Each moral, scientific, religious 
or economic turn was considered from the point of view of change. In 1772 
Louis Mercier stated that ‘[…] all is revolution in this world’49. Secondly, 
revolution was contrasted with civil war. Progress of civilization was 
supposed to give a bloodless character to a change of political systems. 
A civil war became associated with a limited turn, in contrast to new areas 
opened by revolutions. A revolution ceased to be a term of a physical-
political domain. The co-existence of the two meanings of revolution lasted 
till the end of 18th century, till the French Revolution50.
In the age of reason, the meaning of revolution exceeded the domain of 
political sciences, embracing other domains of reality. Beginning with the 
18th century, the term became vague51 and it was impossible to determine 
its limited sense. Its vagueness and connotations with movement resulted 
47 R. Koselleck, Semantyka, pp. 112–113. 
48 ‘[…] choć w przednowożytnym języku politycznym dość było słów, aby opisać 
powstanie poddanych przeciwko władcy, to nie było żadnego, które by opisywało 
zmianę tak radykalną, że poddani sami stają się władcami’. H. Arendt, O rewolucji, 
Kraków 1991, p. 39.
49 ‘[…] wszystko jest na tym świecie rewolucją’. After: R. Koselleck, Semantyka, p. 113.
50 Up till 1905 a dualistic sense of the term revolution could be observed. This is 
evidenced by the 19th century understanding of revolution in Portugal. 
51 In the vague set, its element may belong to the set to a certain degree or with a certain 
probability. For more on vague logic: E. Januszewski, Logiczne i filozoficzne problemy z logiką 
rozmytą, ‘Roczniki Filozoficzne’ 2007, 55, 1.
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in its ambiguity52. The consequences of broadening the scope of revolution 
can be seen today. Tadeusz Łepkowski, studying the birth of revolution, 
distinguishes between three categories. The first is a long-lasting technical-
economic-civil revolution. It embraces industrial (17th century, 18th 
century, scientific-technical revolutions), agrarian (biological-chemical-
agrarian, to be specific), neolithic and demographic-medical revolutions. 
The second type covers revolutions at the meeting point of ‘social being, 
technology and biology’53, which referred to ‘[…] the sphere of the mind, 
spirit, intellect and moral sensitivity, to internal experience’54. What 
Łepkowski had in mind were mental, cultural, moral and religious revolts. 
Changes, which took a long time or had long-lasting effects, should belong 
to the category of radical social changes. This is the aftermath of the 
semantic changes happening in the 18th century. Changes, previously not 
located on the time axis and not understood in terms of linear development, 
were classified as a type of revolution55. The moment in which an eternal 
turn transforms into the idea of a new beginning was a rejection of the past 
by the French in 1789. The course of the French Revolution, its ideas and 
aftermath determined contemporary views on revolution. 14th July, 1789 
was when the Duke of la Rochefoucold-Liancourt informed Louis XVI 
about the fall of the Bastille. The king supposedly shouted: ‘It’s a revolt!’. 
The Duke replied: ‘No Sir, this is a revolution!’56. This dialogue became 
historic because of the unprecedented meaning of the term revolution. It is 
worth mentioning that the multiple senses of the term and the complexity 
52 It should be noted that polysemy may be treated as something positive. See: W. 
Czajkowski, O pewnych poznawczych pożytkach płynących z wieloznaczności słowa ‘rewolucja’, 
in: O rewolucji. Obrazy radykalnej zmiany społecznej, eds. K. Brzechczyn, M. Nowak, Poznań 
2007, pp. 13–36.
53 ‘człowieka społecznego, techniki i biologii’.
54 ‘[…] sfery umysłu i ducha, intelektu i wrażliwości moralnej, do przeżyć wewnętrznych’. 
T. Łepkowski, Narodziny rewolucji: aspekty społeczno-polityczne, in: Przemoc zbiorowa. Ruch 
masowy. Rewolucja, eds. E. Kaczyńska, Z.W. Rykowski, Warszawa 1990, pp. 11–12.
55 As a result, we deal with a specific inflation of the term revolution. Polysemy of the 
term entails a transfer of meaning onto new domains of social life: starting with scientific 
revolutions, through moral revolutions (e.g. sexual revolutions), cultural (the 1960s in 
China and after 1968 in the Western world), national, industrial, and technological ones. 
See: L. Russo, Zapomniana rewolucja: grecka myśl naukowa a nauka nowoczesna, Warszawa 
2005; S. Shapin, Rewolucja naukowa, Warszawa 2000; Kobieta i rewolucja obyczajowa: społeczno-
kulturowe aspekty seksualności. Wiek XIX i XX, eds. A. Szwarc, A. Żarnowska, Warszawa 
2006; R. Kimball, Długi marsz: jak rewolucja kulturalna z lat 60. zmieniła Amerykę, Elbląg 2008; 
J. Tomasiewicz, Rewolucja narodowa: nacjonalistyczne koncepcje rewolucji społecznej w Drugiej 
Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa 2012; J. Rifkin, Trzecia rewolucja przemysłowa: jak lateralny model 
władzy inspiruje całe pokolenie i zmienia oblicze świata, Katowice 2012; P. Gawrysiak, Cyfrowa 
rewolucja: rozwój cywilizacji informacyjnej, Warszawa 2008.
56 ‘To jest rewolta!’. ‘Nie Panie, to jest rewolucja’. H. Arendt, O rewolucji, pp. 46–47.
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of the phenomenon bore resemblance to some aspects of other events, 
especially those, which were characteristic of violence and the mobility 
of the masses. The dialogue shows how thin the line has been between 
various events connected with social changes. Mark Hagopian in his book 
The Phenomenon of Revolution, in the chapter titled What revolution is not 
enumerated confused terms: coup d'état (e.g. putsch, palace revolution), 
revolt (e.g. rebellion, peasants’ revolt, municipal revolt), secession (e.g. 
colonial, religious, regional)57. A similar distinction was reached by 
Samuel Huntington, who made a distinction between a revolution and an 
insurrection, revolt, coup d'état, rebellion and independence war58. 
What is more, in order to understand the idea of revolution we should 
remember that independence is strictly dependent on the experience 
of time in which the cycle of history begins anew. Count of Mirabeau 
described revolution as a borderline between despotism and liberty59. 
This issue was also addressed by Condorcet, who claimed that the word 
revolutionary may be only used in reference to those revolutions which aim 
at liberty60. This idea was implemented by Robespierre, who described 
the order he established as the ‘despotism of liberty’. Liberty became an 
attribute of a radical social change. In this context La Fayette highlighted 
voluntarism of the masses, claiming that ‘[…] people become free the 
moment they want to be free’61. The link between the concept of revolution 
(in a socio-political sense) and ideas of the 19th century connected with 
socialism, nationalism, religion, each glorifying freedom, left a mark 
on the ideological treatment of the interpretation and understanding of 
revolution62.
Another phenomenon that appeared together with the idea of a new 
beginning was violence63. The new stage could not begin without getting 
rid of the weight of the past. The only way to reach another step towards 
inevitable progress was to be made rapidly. Observing the Great Terror, 
Joseph de Maistre noted that ‘[…] there is nothing but violence in the 
world’64. Hanna Arendt pointed towards violence as an immanent part 
57 M. Hagopian, The Phenomenon of Revolution, New York 1974, pp. 1–44.
58 S.P. Huntington, Political, p. 264.
59 J. Baszkiewicz, Danton, Warszawa 1990, p. 28.
60 Zob. B. Baczko, Rewolucja. Władza, nadzieje, rozterki, Gdańsk 2010, pp. 30–33. 
61 ‘[…] lud staje się wolny natychmiast, gdy zechce być wolny’. J. Baszkiewicz, op. cit., p. 28.
62 J. Topolski, Jak się pisze, p. 182.
63 The relationship between violence and cognition, and the role of symbolic violence 
in the shaping of cultural games was studied by Andrzej Zybertowicz in Przemoc i poznanie: 
studium z nie-klasycznej socjologii wiedzy, Toruń 1995. 
64 ‘[…] we wszechświecie nie ma nic prócz przemocy’. After: M. Milewska, Ocet i łzy. 
Terror Wielkiej Rewolucji Francuskiej jako doświadczenie traumatyczne, Gdańsk 2001, p. 17.
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of any revolution, stating that ‘[…] only when change occurs in a sense of 
a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different 
form of government and where the liberation from oppression aims at least 
at the constitution of freedom, can we speak of revolution’65. Violence was 
not only the quality of revolutionists, but also of ordinary, random people 
in the times of crime, aggression and war66. Violence, which led to a revolt, 
was subject to radicalisation in the course of a revolutionary process. 
Especially intriguing has been the discord between the expectations of 
the thinkers in the Enlightenment and reality. A model to follow was the 
Glorious Revolution. The experience of 1688 in England was a conclusive 
argument for optimism. Paradoxically, most revolutions against violence 
ended up as mechanisms and spirals of violence (see: France 1789, Mexico 
1910, Russia 1917, Spain 1936–1938, Cuba 1959, Cambodia 1975). The course 
of revolution leading towards increasing repressions was explained as 
a reaction to the threat of counterrevolution or the fifth column. Francois 
Furet, investigating the French Revolution, noticed that radicalisation of 
the attitudes67 stemmed from the internal dynamics of the revolutionary 
process, the final spectrum of which is madness68. Apart from violence as 
an element of revolution, we can generalise that the past was an arena of 
fighting and violence69.
The abovementioned observation demonstrate what significant 
a semantic shift has been made in relation to the French Revolution. The 
model of revolution changed significantly. It reevaluated its characteristic 
features, it shaped the future mythologisation of each significant 
political, social or economic change. The French Revolution, which had 
a lot in common with the American Revolution, became the archetype 
of a big revolt. Each of the following social changes, just like in the case 
of primitive ontological concepts, became real only when they followed 
the archetype. Mircea Eliade wrote ‘[…] thus reality is acquired solely 
through repetition or participation; everything which lacks an exemplary 
model is ‘meaningless’, i.e., it lacks reality’70. The archetype of the French 
65 ‘[…] tam gdzie pojawia się zmiana w sensie nowego początku, gdzie gwałt zostaje 
użyty do ustanowienia zupełnie innej formy ustrojowej i gdzie wyzwolenie spod ucisku 
przynajmniej dąży do zaprowadzenia wolności, tam możemy mówić o rewolucji’. 
H. Arendt, O rewolucji, p. 33. 
66 See: H. Arendt, Korzenie totalitaryzmu, Warszawa 2014, pp. 387–422.
67 See: B. Baczko, Jak wyjść z Terroru: Termidor a Rewolucja, Gdańsk 2005.
68 See: F. Furet, Prawdziwy koniec rewolucji francuskiej, Warszawa 1994.
69 M. Kula, Przemoc: zmienne zjawisko długiego trwania, in: Dramat przemocy w historycznej 
perspektywie, eds. J. Chrobaczyński, W. Wrzesiński, Kraków 2004, pp. 39–57.
70 ‘[…] w ten sposób rzeczywistość osiąga się wyłącznie przez powtórzenie lub 
uczestnictwo; wszystko, co nie ma wzorcowego modelu, jest ‘ogołocone z sensu’, to znaczy 
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Revolution was realised through violence because the ‘[…] execution of 
the king was the founding violence, an act of foundation of the Republic’71, 
and the acts of violence which followed were only its repetition72. In 1842, 
Barthélemy Hauréau, from the perspective of an observer and first-hand 
witness of the aftermath of the French Revolution, concluded that the 
well-known term revolution had lost its original meaning and became fuel 
for human resources of knowledge73. What features did the concept of the 
mythical night of 14th July, 1789 gain then? The definition as proposed by 
Hannah Arendt pointed towards five basic features of revolution: novelty, 
liberty, new beginning, violence, inevitability. Only the last one, which 
with time evolved into the idea of historical inevitability, was associated 
with the primary meaning of the term. It was this distinguishing feature 
that played a key role in the vision of a radical change. It contributed to the 
mythologisation of revolution74. The immanent naturalness of revolution, 
its astronomic level, independent of human intervention, resulted in it being 
regarded as a starting point for the interpretation of human history and 
experienced reality75. As a result of philosophical influences, revolution, 
separated from the social world, is beyond it, which is particularly visible 
in objective idealism and the philosophy of history by Hegel.
What is more, in the context of radical social change, we should also 
mention the ideas proposed by Waldemar Czajkowski and Reinhart 
Koselleck. The former defined a network of concepts that can be 
attribute to revolution. His ideas are grounded in ‘semantic holism’. The 
sociological sense (‘objective’) of this concept is formed by various ideas: 
depth, completeness, immediacy, collective causation, and intensity. 
In the phenomenological sense (‘subjective’) revolution is an extraordinary 
change. 
The analysis by Koselleck pertains mainly to the semantic field, which 
is gained in 178976. The basis for his ideas is the hypothesis that the experi-
ence of modernity is also the experience of new time77. In relation to revo-
lution, it was a break-off with the previous structure of time and a change 
brak mu rzeczywistości’. M. Eliade, Mity i historia, in: Mit wiecznego powrotu, Warszawa 
1998, p. 46.
71 ‘[…] egzekucja króla była w istocie ową przemocą założycielską, aktem fundującym 
Republikę’. M. Milewska, op. cit., p. 20.
72 See: J. Chrobaczyński, Czy przemoc jest ‘motorem’ historii?, in: Dramat, pp. 19–26. 
73 After: R. Koselleck, Semantyka, p. 115. 
74 See: M. Woźniak, Doświadczanie historii: kulturowy i społeczny wymiar mitu rewolucji, 
Lublin 2003, pp. 65–66.
75 Ibidem, p. 66.
76 R. Koselleck, Semantyka, pp. 116–129.
77 Idem, Dzieje, p. 78.
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in how history changed together with the Great French Revolution. Firstly, 
revolution is made up of the experience of the way from a political revolu-
tion to a social one (the element of reform is included). The social element 
became the essence of a radical turn as the whole social structure was to 
change. It was noted that it was in 1794 that the process of making France 
‘the opposite of the existing countries’78 was termed as ‘social revolution’. 
Another feature of revolution was directly connected with the first one, i.e. 
any step towards emancipation was to be made immediately. This, in turn, 
was meant to shorten the experienced time of revolution. The movement 
of the people seemed to shorten or even not to matter. This established 
revolution as a meta-historical concept in the domain of philosophy of 
history. The meta-historical aspect is derived from the understanding of 
revolution as a collective prime number, i.e. from Mercier’s statement that 
everything in the world is revolution. A rhetorical specification will place 
revolution within various forms of synecdoche: part for whole (pars pro 
toto) and whole for part (totum pro parte). In other words, a revolution was 
made as a certain type of stylistic figure, changing its meaning to achieve 
a specific effect. Hayden White would describe the term as a trope79. What 
is more, Jerzy Szacki perceives the use of revolution ‘[…] alongside meta-
phor: one name is transferred onto another object, creating an illusion of 
its understanding by attributing features which seem to be valid in the 
case of the first one’80.
Revolution brought about a new dictionary. The verbal noun 
‘revolutionisation’ and the verb ‘to revolutionise’ led to the derivation of 
previously unknown ‘revolutionist’. The neologism was coined together 
with the belief that individuals can change the course of history. Its essence 
was the activist necessity to start a revolution in light of any circumstances 
making it real. In such a case, revolution is to be carried out by its 
people81. ‘Revolutionist’ as a political actor was born with the fall of the 
ancien regime. It was in a broad sense a supporter of new ideas, engaged 
in political fighting and relying on agitation of crowds82. The adjective 
78 ‘odwrotności dziś istniejących państw’.
79 H. White, Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe, 
Baltimore–London 1973, pp. 31–38.
80 ‘[…] na prawach metafory: nazwę przenosi się z jednego przedmiotu na inny, 
wywołując złudzenie jego rozumienia przez przypisanie mu cech, które na zasadzie 
oczywistości zdają się przysługiwać temu pierwszemu’. J. Szacki, Parę uwag o teorii 
rewolucji, in: Przemoc zbiorowa. Ruch masowy. Rewolucja, eds. E. Kaczyńska, Z.W. Rykowski, 
Warszawa 1990, p. 26.
81 See: A. Zamoyski, Święte Szaleństwo. Romantycy, patrioci, rewolucjoniści 1776–1871, 
Kraków 2015.
82 B. Baczko, Rewolucja, pp. 37–39.
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‘revolutionary’83 describes anything related to revolution, but only the 
one aiming at liberty84. The spirit and rules of revolution were derived 
from such a definition. According to Emmanuel Sieyès, ‘[…] the spirit of 
revolution is the spirit capable of starting and leading a revolution for 
freedom’, and the law of revolution is ‘[…] the law the subject of which is 
to keep and accelerate revolution’85. The law of revolution was helpful in 
the emergence of another concept relating to revolution, i.e. legal validity 
to emerge. A term ‘absolute revolution’ was coined, suggesting that 
revolutionary movement derives any legal rights from itself.
One of the major paradoxes of radical turns appeared at the turn of the 
18th and 19th century, viewed from the perspective of time: one or many 
revolutions? A revolutionary process and consciousness, revived by an 
interaction with it, were inextricably linked. Since the French Revolution, 
it was an immanent part, an internal contradiction inherent in the word. 
Koselleck noted that the viewpoint derived from the semantic field of the 
modern revolution (bearing in mind its lack of logic) leads to the perception 
of movement and change in terms of time and space. A revolution is meant 
to be permanent, timewise, and its spatial scope should be global.
A juxtaposition of all the above mentioned semantic fields makes 
Koselleck regard revolution as a meta-historical concept within the scope 
of philosophy of history, with absolutist ambitions. He wrote that ‘[…] 
since the whole world is to be revolutionised, it means that revolution 
should last as long as the goal is achieved’86. Additionally, the criterion 
of legal validity legitimises revolution, which in the magic charm of 
historical inevitability obliges revolutionists to use violence in their fight 
for freedom, in their battle for a New Beginning. 
1.3. THE BIRTH OF THEORy
After the French Revolution the issue of the relationship between the 
past, present and future acquired a political dimension. A belief in a better 
83 Attempts to define the word revolutionary were made, among others, by Condorcet 
in his article On the meaning of the word revolutionary published 1.06.1793.
84 Ibidem, p. 29.
85 ‘[…] duch rewolucyjny to duch zdolny wytwarzać rewolucję dokonaną dla 
wolności i nią kierować’. ‘[…] prawo, którego przedmiotem jest utrzymanie tej rewolucji 
lub przyśpieszenie jej biegu’. After: B. Baczko, Rewolucja, p. 7.
86 ‘[…] skoro cała ziemia ma być zrewolucjonizowana, to wynika z tego niewątpliwie, 




future spread, and on the basis of a scientific understanding of history 
people would reach the said future thanks to their conscious, collective 
and orchestrated effort. That was the moment when science-aspiring 
philosophy of history was born, claiming that it found the direction and 
the final sense of history87. 
These were the French and the American revolution in which Hannah Arendt 
saw significant moments which influenced the sense of theories on radical 
social change88. In terms of theoretical reflection, the biggest consequence of 
the Great French Revolution was the birth of a new understanding of history. 
The revolutionary concept, which stemmed from the French Revolution, was 
Hegel’s philosophy of history. According to Hegel89, reality (logical, necessary 
and reasonable) is a dialectical whole, which aims to understand itself. 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) rationalised history by means of 
evolutionary idealism (in line with the rules of reason), evolving into higher 
and higher form of self-analysis by overcoming previous ideas (pattern: thesis 
– anti-thesis – synthesis). In this understanding, historical progress is dialectical 
and despite its idealistic character, it introduced philosophical absolute into 
the domain of human relationships. Paradoxically, a consequence of the turn 
of philosophy into philosophy of history was the placement of inevitability 
instead of liberty as the major category behind the revolutionary idea. Arendt 
saw the cause of such a change in the observers, not actors or participants, 
describing and interpreting revolutions. ‘A perspective of the audience 
watching a performance’90 left a mark on all the future revolutionary changes, 
just as it did on Hegel’s philosophy of history.
Hegel’s philosophical reflection shaped two major discourses regarding 
radical social change. The first is based on a mythologised, appraising 
and non-scientific understanding of revolution. Within this discourse 
revolution becomes a basic mechanism of change to reality. Fascination 
and terror, the two approaches which were typical of the French Revolution 
facilitated the perception of revolution from the perspective of collective 
imagination. The myth91 of revolution, as one of the fundamental myths, 
87 I use the term ‘philosophy of history’ after Krzysztof Pomian. He makes a clear 
distinction between ‘ideology’ from ‘philosophy of history’. See: K. Pomian, Porządek czasu, 
Gdańsk 2014, pp. 287–288.
88 H. Arendt, O rewolucji, p. 50.
89 Hegel’s understanding of the mind as a basic force in history was developed 
by Herbert Marcuse who believed liberty should be the basic category of the mind. 
See: H. Marcuse, Rozum i rewolucja: Hegel a powstanie teorii społecznej, Warszawa 1966; 
Z.J. Czarnecki, Przyszłość i historia, Lublin 1981.
90 ‘Perspektywa widza oglądającego przedstawienie’. H. Arendt, O rewolucji, p. 51.
91 I agree with the definition of a myth by Bronisław Malinowski, who wrote that 
a myth ‘[…] nie jest wyjaśnieniem zaspokajającym potrzebę zainteresowań naukowych, 
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is rife with the idea of the past existence of events, processes, which 
have ‘[…] the power of dividing the historical process into smaller parts, 
which clearly point towards differences between the state before and after 
revolution. In light of these differences a narration is organised not only 
in a chronological order but also in terms of selection and hierarchy of 
the material, hence in terms of the content and persuasion techniques 
(concerning authenticity and ideology)’92. Topolski searched for the causes 
of ideology of revolution in linking the thoughts of radical change with the 
major ideas of the 19th century, i.e. socialism, nationalism, and religion93. 
Another concept was proposed by Wojciech Wrzosek, who suggested 
using metaphor in relation to revolution. Revolution understood as 
a metaphor would stand ‘[…] in opposition to the metaphors of growth 
and genesis, fundamental to the Western culture, and to a certain degree 
(???) would be their completion’94.
The abovementioned understanding of revolution from the perspective 
of a myth or a metaphor, i.e. the tools bringing order to the experience of 
history (the so-called structuring of experience), are exceptionally effective 
in the process of becoming historical knowledge95. A feature of such an 
ale narracją, w której zmartwychwstaje pradawna rzeczywistość, narracją opowiadaną 
dla zaspokojenia głębokich potrzeb religijnych, uzasadnienia dążeń moralnych, […] 
wyjaśnienia twierdzeń czy nawet wymogów praktycznych. W kulturze pierwotnej mit jest 
nieodzowny: wyraża, wzbogaca i kodyfikuje wierzenia; chroni i wzmacnia moralność; […] 
zawiera reguły, którymi człowiek powinien się kierować. Mit jest żywotnym składnikiem 
cywilizacji ludzkiej; nie jest czczym opowiadaniem, ale aktywną, stale działającą siłą’ [‘[…] 
is not an explanation fulfilling scientific needs but a narration which resurrects primeval 
reality, narration told to fulfill deep religious needs, to justify moral desires, […] to explain 
statements and practical demands. In the primitive cultures a myth is a necessity: it is 
a form of expression; it enriches and codifies beliefs; it protects and intensifies morality; 
[…] it offers rules that people should follow. It is a living part of the human civilisation; it 
is not an empty story but rather an active, working force’]. See: B. Malinowski, Mit, magia, 
religia, in: Dzieła, vol. 7, Warszawa 1990, p. 303; The issue of a myth has been studied in an 
trans-disciplinary way. The available literature is extremely rich, some of the major works 
include: R. Barthes, Mitologie, Warszawa 2008; M. Eliade, Aspekty mitu, Warszawa 1998; L. 
Kołakowski, Obecność mitu, Warszawa 2005.
92 ‘[…] moc dzielenia procesu historycznego na odcinki, w których wyraźnie 
wskazuje się na różnice między stanem przed (rewolucją) i po (rewolucji), i w świetle 
tych różnic organizuje się narrację nie tylko pod względem chronologicznym, lecz także 
pod względem selekcji i hierarchizacji materiału, a więc i pod względem treści i sposobu 
perswazji (prawdziwościowej i ideologicznej)’. J. Topolski, Jak się pisze, p. 180.
93 Ibidem, p. 182.
94 ‘[…] w opozycji do fundamentalnych dla kultury zachodniej metafor rozwoju 
i genezy, a w pewnym stopniu (???) stanowi ich uzupełnienie’. W. Wrzosek, op. cit., p. 38; 
Also Koselleck analyses revolution from the perspective of metaphor. See: R. Koselleck, 
Dzieje, pp. 265–271.
95 On the role of revolution in understanding the past: M. Woźniak, op. cit., pp. 18–64; 
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understanding of revolution is its evaluation, either positive or negative, 
hyperbole or deprecation, and creation of illusions. I understand illusions 
similarly to Furet as a specific system of ideas regarding the past, present 
or future reality, which justifies and evaluates it and facilitates action 
based on the objectives of the system96. The major foundation of illusion is 
the past, which is subject to reinterpretation, reconstruction or falsification 
according to the binding vision of the world. Czesław Miłosz defined the 
way of thinking designed for the mythical captivation of the mind as an 
intense vulgarity of knowledge97. 
The dialectical method in the Marxist perspective (but also in other 
perspectives) resembles a system of bridges cast over precipices98. Bridges 
create an illusion that there is no precipice, and one can walk forward. 
Such an illusion is one of the elements constituting a myth. Mythical 
thinking has a great power – it has roots in the past and provides density 
and contiguity to the society.
Hegelianism rationalised history, and myth seems to be an ideal tool 
for a reasonable ordering of events and of a historical understanding. 
Revolution fitted the dialectical evolution of reality, which became the 
foundation of the Marxist philosophy. Lenin’s interpretation of Karl 
Marx’s thoughts became the most famous extension of the German 
thinker’s ideas. However, the basis for Marxist claims were Hegel’s and 
his disciples’ philosophy. The primary Marxism understood revolution 
as a beginning of a new era in the development of societies. It was a social 
revolution connected with a change in economic formations. The Marxist 
model of social change was based on a deterministic character of social life, 
which depends on an economic structure, which is influenced by means 
of production. A major problem with the Marxist ideas was the reversed 
dependence between the surrounding world and an individual. He claimed 
that ‘[…] it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence 
but their social existence that determines their consciousness’99. This 
thought was verified and falsified, yet, the influence of Marxist philosophy 
on the 19th and 20th century world was enormous. Marxism aspired to be 
a philosophy, economy, sociology, but also a political religion. Revolution 
appeared within the theoretical constructs by Marx and Engels as ‘[…] 
a leap of humanity from the kingdom of inevitability onto the kingdom 
J. Topolski, Jak się pisze, pp. 180–189.
96 F. Furet, Przeszłość pewnego złudzenia, Warszawa 1996, p. 11
97 Cz. Miłosz, Zniewolony umysł, Paryż 1953, p. 154
98 Ibidem, p. 155.
99 ‘[…] nie świadomość ludzi określa ich byt, lecz przeciwnie, ich społeczny byt określa 
ich świadomość’. K. Marks, Przyczynek do krytyki ekonomii politycznej, Warszawa 1953, p. 5.
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of freedom’100. The idea of revolution was immanently written in the 
process of evolution of socio-economic formations, it was supposed to be 
an emanation of the ever-growing class struggle. The ruling class exploits 
the inferior class, the oppression grows, and the alienation of the exploited 
ends together with their class consciousness, which pushes them towards 
revolution. In other words, revolutionary explosion takes place as a result 
of an extreme oppression. According to this idea, revolution ends with 
a change in output methods, which affects the whole society. A change in 
the base leads to a big change in the superstructure101. The Marxist theory 
of revolution found its reflection in Marx’s comments on philosophy: ‘The 
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, 
however, is to change it’102. Universal aspirations behind Marxism resulted 
in Marx’s ideas becoming an inspiration for left-wing social movements 
across the world, which in the second half of the 20th century turned his 
thoughts into a secular theology, and his doctrine was treated as a set of 
dogmas103.
In opposition to the Marxist interpretation of history, other 
interpretations of revolution emerged, full of mythical thinking. The 
lusophone culture developed a vision of radical social change, in 
opposition to Marxism but also to the whole legacy of the Great French 
Revolution. Its author was the Brazilian thinker, Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira, 
who placed revolution within the frame of a world-shaking civilisation 
crisis, whose scope of activity is humanity104. The book titled Revolution 
and counterrevolution was published in 1959 and had 26 editions, being 
translated into 10 languages. It offers a concept of the crisis of the Western 
civilisation, which is: common – ‘There is not a single nation, which has 
not experienced to a greater or lesser extent’105; unified – ‘It is not a number 
of crises developing independently from one another, in each country, 
mutually linked through more or less important analogies’106; total – 
100 ‘[…] skok ludzkości z królestwa konieczności w królestwo wolności’. F. Engels, 
Przewrót w nauce dokonany przez pana Eugeniusza Dühringa, in: K. Marks, F. Engels, Dzieła, 
vol. 20, Warszawa 1972, p. 316.
101 L. Kołakowski, Główne nurty marksizmu, vol. 1, Warszawa 2009, p. 337.
102 ‘Filozofowie rozmaicie tylko interpretowali świat; idzie jednak o to, aby go zmienić’. 
K. Marks, Tezy o Feuerbachu, in: K. Marks, F. Engels, Dzieła, vol. 3, Warszawa 1982, p. 8.
103 Por. E. Hobsbawm, Jak zmienić świat. Marks i marksizm 1840–2011, Warszawa 2013, 
pp. 375–430.
104 P.C. de Oliviera, Rewolucja i kontrrewolucja, Kraków 2006, p. 25.
105 ‘Nie ma dziś narodu, na który nie oddziaływał w większym lub mniejszym stopniu’. 
Ibidem, p. 27.
106 ‘Nie jest to szereg kryzysów rozwijających się obok siebie niezależnie, w każdym 
kraju, wzajemnie powiązanych ze sobą przez mniej lub bardziej istotne analogie’. Ibidem.
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‘[…] the crisis develops on such a deep level of problems that naturally 
it spreads into all levels of the soul, all cultural areas and finally all the 
spheres of human activity’107; dominant – ‘[…] the crisis resembles a ruler, 
who is served by all the powers of chaos as useful and obedient tools’108; 
a process – ‘[…] the crisis is not a spectacular, isolated episode. On the 
contrary, it becomes a critical process lasting over five centuries now. It 
is a long chain of causes and effects, which emerged at certain point with 
great force, in the deepest corners of the soul and culture of the Western 
civilisation and has been bringing convulsions since the 15th century’109. 
A critical process described and analysed by de Oliveira is revolution par 
excellence. The word ‘revolution’ entails a movement leading towards the 
destruction of the legal authorities and legal order and towards replacing 
them with illegal authorities and illegal order110. Revolution consists of 
three layers: disorderly tendencies111, crisis of ideas (e.g. in creation of 
new doctrines) and the existence of sphere of facts (transformation of 
institutions, law and tradition). The driving force behind revolution is the 
first layer. What is more, the destructive character of the crisis is present in 
its genesis. De Oliveira wrote that: ‘[…] since the very first explosions, the 
force is present with its full fierceness, which will be revealed in its worst 
excesses. For instance, the first contestations of Protestantism included 
implicitly anachronistic objectives of communism. Luther was nothing 
more, to put it bluntly, than Luther, however, all the tendencies, states of 
the soul, imponderables of the Reformation, were marked in an authentic 
way, even though implicitly, the spirit of Voltaire, Robespierre, Marx and 
Lenin’112. This revolution, crawling since 15th/16th century expressed 
107 ‘[…] kryzys ten rozwija się na tak głębokim poziomie problemów, że z samej natury 
rzeczy rozciąga się lub rozpościera na wszystkie władze duszy, wszystkie dziedziny 
kultury i w końcu wszystkie sfery ludzkiego działania’. Ibidem, p. 28.
108 ‘[…] kryzys ten przypomina władcę, któremu służą wszystkie siły chaosu jako 
pożyteczne i posłuszne narzędzia’. Ibidem, pp. 28–29.
109 ‘[…] kryzys ten nie jest jakimś spektakularny, odizolowanym epizodem. Przeciwnie, 
stanowi on krytyczny proces trwający już pięć wieków. Jest to długi łańcuch przyczyn 
i skutków, który wyłoniwszy się w pewnym momencie z wielką siłą, w najgłębszych 
zakątkach duszy i kultury człowieka Zachodu, wywołuje konwulsje począwszy od XV 
wieku’. Ibidem, pp. 29–40.
110 Ibidem, p. 57.
111 The word ‘tendency’ is understood in a psychological and spiritual sense, not in 
a sociological or political sense.
112 ‘[…] od pierwszej chwili swoich wielkich eksplozji siła ta posiada już potencjalnie 
całą zaciekłość, którą ujawni później w swoich najgorszych ekscesach. Na przykład 
w pierwszych kontestacjach protestantyzmu były już zawarte implicite anarchiczne 
pragnienia komunizmu. Luter nie był, mówiąc wprost, nikim więcej jak tylko Lutrem, 
lecz wszystkie tendencje, stany duszy i imponderabilia luterańskiego wybuchu nosiły już 
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itself in disorderly tendencies, which, like habits, develop proportionately 
to their satisfaction. Such an understanding of revolution is seen as 
a permanent crisis, specific perpetuum mobile, which since the reformation 
has been changing the world, leading towards its fall. For revolution, 
par excellence the only natural opposition would be counter-revolution, 
understood as a reaction, i.e. action directed against another action. If 
revolution is a disorder, a systematic chaos, counter-revolution brings 
the order back. Just as there is a revolutionary process, overturning order, 
counter-revolution works analogically but in the opposite direction. It is 
seen by de Oliveira as ‘[…] progressive […] march towards order’113, which 
‘[…] stems from the fact that dynamism of good is radically different from 
dynamism of evil’114. De Oliveira’s vision resembles and borrows from 
the legacy of Jospeh de Maistre, for whom the revolutionary process also 
started in the time of the Reformation (labelled by de Oliveira ‘pseudo-
reformation’).
If Marx saw the plane for revolution in the material foundations of 
social reality, then de Oliveria laid emphasis on the spiritual aspects of 
human life because all the crises have their roots in the deepest problems 
of the soul, ‘[…] from where they spread to the individual’s whole 
personality and all their actions’115. Viewed from this perspective, these 
are two mythical, totally different visions of revolution understood as 
a mechanism to change the world.
Another discourse is related to the scientific reflection over revolution. 
A major difficulty for researchers is the poly-semantic nature of the subject 
of study in the historical perspective. The colloquial understanding of the 
term and the contradictory definitions of revolution result in a conceptual 
chaos. Plurality of the research strategies points to constant searching for 
effective tools of conceptualisation. For the sake of this article presenting 
an overview of revolution theories, the most effective definition seems 
to be the one proposed by Anthony Giddens, who describes it as ‘[…] 
a process of political change thanks to massive social movement through 
violent overthrowing of the existing regime and formation of a new 
government’116. Generally, the major research areas over revolutionary 
w sobie autentycznie i w pełni, choć tylko implicite, ducha Woltera i Robespierra oraz 
Marksa i Lenina’. Ibidem, p. 47.
113 ‘[…] postępujący […] marsz ku porządkowi’.
114 ‘[…] wynika z faktu, że dynamizm dobra jest radykalnie odmienny od dynamizmu 
zła’. Ibidem, p. 117.
115 ‘[…] skąd rozciągają się na całą osobowość człowieka i wszystkie jego działania’. 
Ibidem, p. 25.
116 ‘[…] proces zmiany politycznej dzięki masowemu ruchowi społecznemu przez 
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changes can be divided into two: idiographic and nomothetic, in line with 
the classic taxonomy proposed by Wilhelm Windelband and Henry Rickert. 
Idiographic analyses, i.e. descriptive ones, dealing with the establishment 
of individual, specific facts and the ordering of specific events, are typical 
of first reflections over a given phenomenon, especially in historical 
works. The nomothetic approach is characteristic of analyses dealing with 
regularities and general laws of science. By observing the development of 
science, we notice a constant evolution towards formulation of common 
laws of the surrounding reality. 
A classic work in the field of revolution studies, with the ambition to 
discover general laws and still valid today is the work The Old Regime 
and the Revolution by Alexis de Tocqueville. The French thinker studies 
the ‘genealogy’ of the French Revolution. He tried to find the roots of 
the radical change in France in the medieval social system. A historical-
comparative study shows regularity of events taking place in a specific 
place at a specific time and shows some general laws behind them. The 
ambition of Tocqueville was to explain the nature of revolution rather 
than its content117. For him, just like his great predecessor, Edmund 
Burke, with whom he often disagreed in his work, the French Revolution 
concealed its true essence. What is more, he was the first to notice the 
paradoxes lying at the foundation of the radical social change and to ask 
for functions of particular social classes, society as a whole and political 
systems. It is worth noting that a conflict between social classes is not 
a cause of a revolution but its consequence. Another major difference 
from Marx’s ideology was the statement that a prerequisite of revolution 
is not the growing oppression of the exploited class. The French example 
demonstrates that the revolution took place after a period of successful 
economic growth. It is quite unusual that intensification of discontent 
happened at that time. Tocqueville noticed that ‘[…] just as prosperity 
grows in France, minds are full of uncertainty and anxiety, general 
discontent intensifies; hatred towards the old institutions starts to grow. 
The nation heads towards revolution’118. He then concluded ‘Revolution 
does not start only when those who are in a bad spot feel even worse. Most 
commonly the nation, which withstands the burdensome law without 
obalenie przemocą istniejącego reżimu i utworzenie nowego rządu’. A. Giddens, Socjologia, 
Warszawa 2005, p. 732.
117 F. Furet, Wstęp, in: A. de Tocqueville, Dawny ustrój i rewolucja, Warszawa 2005, p. 8.
118 ‘[…] w miarę tego, jak wzrasta we Francji ów dobrobyt, o którym mówiłem, 
w umysłach wzmaga się niepewność i niepokój, pogłębia powszechne niezadowolenie; 
wzbiera nienawiść do wszystkich starych instytucji. Naród jawnie zmierza do rewolucji’. 
A. de Tocqueville, Dawny ustrój i rewolucja, Warszawa 2005, p. 216.
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complaint, as if indifferently, suddenly rejects it when they ease a bit. The 
system, which is overthrown by revolution, is almost always better than 
the previous one, and the most dangerous moment for bad government 
is the moment when it starts implementing new reforms […]. The evil 
that people had to endure patiently as something inevitable seems to be 
unbearable the moment when the mind discovers a way out of it. As if each 
abuse which has been overcome allowed to see another one, intensifying 
the effect of abuse. The evil lessens, it is true, however the sensitivity of 
evil intensifies’119. The idea of the author of Democracy in America is a far cry 
from the Marxist vision of revolution, where the economic determinism 
(‘existence determines consciousness’) is the basis for revolutionary 
ideology. For him the Great French Revolution constituted only a sudden 
culmination of a long historical process, because ‘[…] even though it 
surprised the world, it was just the complementation of a long process, 
a sudden and violent end of the work of tens of generations. If it did not 
happen, the old social order would fall into pieces without it, here a little 
bit earlier, there a little bit later, but would fall slowly, piece by piece, 
rather than abruptly. With convulsive, painful efforts, with no gradation, 
with no precautions and with no mercy, the Revolution ended abruptly 
what could die away on its own with time’120. He also added a series of 
important questions: What was the real sense of the French Revolution? 
What are its lasting consequences? What was destroyed and what was 
created by the Revolution?121.
Another major contribution of de Tocqueville for the theory of 
revolution was the expansion of the area, named by Robert Merton (as 
119 ‘Rewolucja nie zawsze wybucha wtedy, kiedy tym, którym było źle, zaczyna być 
jeszcze gorzej. Najczęściej dzieje się tak, że lud, który bez skargi, jakby obojętnie, znosił 
najuciążliwsze prawa, odrzuca je gwałtownie, kiedy ciężar ich nieco zelżeje. Ustrój, który 
rewolucja obala, bywa niemal zawsze lepszy od tego, który go bezpośrednio poprzedzał, 
i doświadczenie uczy, że najniebezpieczniejszą chwilą dla złego rządu bywa zwykle ta, 
w której zaczyna on wprowadzać reformy […]. Zło, które ludzie znosili cierpliwie jako 
nieuniknione, wydaje się nieznośne z chwilą, gdy w umysłach zaświta myśl, że można się 
spod niego wyłamać. Jakby każde usunięte wówczas nadużycie tym wyraźniej pozwalało 
dojrzeć pozostałe, potęgując jeszcze wrażenie ich dokuczliwości. Zło stało się mniejsze, to 
prawda, ale pogłębiła się wrażliwość na zło’. Ibidem, pp. 217–218.
120 ‘[…] choć zaskoczyła świat, była jedynie dopełnieniem długiej pracy, nagłym 
i gwałtownym zakończeniem dzieła, przy którym trudziło się dziesięć ludzkich pokoleń. 
Gdyby się nie była dokonała, stary gmach społeczny rozleciałby się wszędzie i bez niej, 
tutaj wcześniej, tam później, tyle tylko, że dalej rozpadałby się po kawałku zamiast runąć 
nagle. Konwulsyjnymi bolesnym wysiłkiem bez stopniowania, bez przedsięwzięcia 
środków ostrożności i bezwzględnie Rewolucja skończyła nagle to, co z biegiem czasu 
wygasłoby samo przez się’. Ibidem, p. 56.
121 Ibidem, p. 38.
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well as by Piotr Sztompka) ‘a defined area of ignorance’122. He identified 
the paradox or revolution, i.e. the continuity of certain processes, which, 
contrary to intuition, are not broken, and often even become more intense. 
He points towards centralisation of the power, having its roots in the 
previous system. Paradoxically, despite the image of chaos and anarchy, 
revolution does not destroy the state but, as was expected by Marx, leads 
towards its further centralisation123.
The beginnings of the scientific discourse on revolution are tightly 
linked with Tocqueville, but another name, Gustave Le Bon, should be 
mentioned here. The author of the seminal work, The Crowd: A Study of 
the Popular Mind124, analysed revolution from the perspective of crowd 
behaviour. Le Bon treats the crowd as a collective soul. He wrote: ‘In the 
crowd one loses self-awareness of one’s separateness, feelings and thoughts 
of all individuals have only one direction’125. Once one joins the crowd, 
they lose their individual self-awareness and blends in the personality of 
the crowd. Revolution as a phenomenon dependent on the support of the 
masses has a great impact on human thoughts, emotions and behaviour. 
The features of the crowd understood as a basic form of revolutionary 
organisation are irrationality126, violence and destructiveness. The crowds 
adopt various forms of the mind such as: revolutionary Jacobin, crime or 
mystic. They can co-exist during revolution, even though Le Bon focuses 
on the last one. He claims that the mystical nature is the foundation of all 
the religious and political beliefs. That is why revolution inspires mystical 
enthusiasm, which resembles religious faith127. Revolutionary ideas, 
according to Le Bon, spread just like religious beliefs. When mystical 
elements and passion become the components of the revolutionary 
mind, almost always they lead to some sort of extremism (e.g. Jacobin). 
Importantly, ‘[…] the crowd does not possess a capacity for reasoning, 
however, it possesses a great capacity for acting’128. Each type of the crowd 
122 ‘zdefiniowanym polem ignorancji’. R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 
New York 1968, p. 363.
123 J. Chodak, op. cit., p. 45.
124 Zob. G. Le Bon, Psychologia tłumu, Kęty 2013.
125 ‘W tłumie zanika świadomość własnej odrębności, uczucia i myśli wszystkich 
jednostek mają jeden tylko kierunek’. Ibidem, p. 15.
126 Irrationality is an important element of Le Bon’s ideology. His theory was based on 
the assumption of crowd activity breaking with rational forms. The revolutionary crowd 
seemed to be ‘blind’ and subject to all the suggestions. Such a perspective was similar 
to the one proposed by Vilfred Pareto, who highlighted the lack of awareness in crowd 
functioning. 
127 G. Le Bon, The Psychology of Revolution, London 1913, pp. 87–90.
128 ‘[…] tłum nie posiada wielkiej zdolności rozumowania; posiada w zamian wielką 
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is not incapable of acting and consolidating until a leader appears. The 
leader’s suggestions influence the actions of the crowd’s mind. Basic 
methods of leading the crowd are statements, repetition and an infectious 
character. The crowd’s spirit is shaped by the manipulating leader. They 
make use of simple images, words, slogans, all of which create illusions. 
Then ‘[…] individuals constituting the crowd lose a sense of their own will 
and succumb to those who impose their will’129.
Pitirim Sorokin’s theory is regarded as the first full-fledged modern 
theory of revolution. He proposed it in 1925 in his work The Sociology of 
Revolution. Sorokin’s reflections were based on his direct experience of 
the Russian Revolution of 1917. His ideas focused on the pathological 
behaviour of individuals during revolution. It is an example of a behavioural 
approach. He wrote: ‘the conventional clothes of civilised behaviour are 
soon to be taken off and instead of socius we face an unleashed beast’130. 
Regarding these changes Sorokin made a distinction between six areas 
of repression (however, he planned to extend the list): 1) repression of 
food intake, 2) repression of basics of human existence, 3) repression of 
self-preservation activity, 4) repression of possession instinct, 5) sexual 
repression, 6) repression of self-expression and individuality131. All the 
above mentioned distortions ‘[…] break with conditioned responses, 
disrupt obedience, discipline, order and civilised forms of behaviour, 
change human beings into wild hordes of lunatics’132. Revolution can be 
triggered by repression or suppression of instincts. Importantly, most 
often revolution is preceded by war, which leads towards intensification of 
oppression of instincts and towards disorganisation of the state organism. 
These are indirect factors of radical change. Direct causes of revolution are 
threefold. Firstly, an increase in ‘repression’ of basic instincts of the social 
majority and inability to fulfil their needs133. Secondly, a lack of reaction 
from the authorities. The ruling class cannot stop attempts to change the 
zdolność do działania’. G. Le Bon, Psychologia, p. 12.
129 ‘[…] jednostki tworzące tłum zatracają poczucie własnej woli i bezwiednie ulegają 
temu, kto potrafi narzucać ją innym’. Ibidem, p. 58. 
130 ‘Konwencjonalny strój cywilizowanego zachowania zostaje szybko zrzucony 
i zamiast socius stajemy twarzą w twarz ze spuszczoną z łańcucha bestią’. After: P. 
Sztompka, Socjologia, p. 286 (Sorokin’s translations after P. Sztompka); Conf.: P. Sorokin, 
The Sociology of Revolution, New York 1967, p. 372; J. Chodak, op. cit., p. 51.
131 According to Jarosław Chodak, Sorokin borrowed the ideas on the role of instincts 
and human nature from Ivan Pavlov and Vilfred Pareto. See: ibidem, p. 51 (footnote 5).
132 ‘[…] przełamują odruchy warunkowe, burzą posłuszeństwo, dyscyplinę, porządek 
i cywilizowane formy zachowania i zamieniają istoty ludzkie w dzikie hordy szaleńców’. 
P. Sorokin, op. cit., p. 376.
133 Ibidem, p. 367.
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system. Thirdly, these factors should be of a general character. These 
are the necessary conditions for revolution to take place – a grassroots 
pressure combined with the weakness of the authorities. Sorokin noticed 
that revolution does not improve the situation of the oppressed groups yet 
after some time it leads to further repression of their instincts. Therefore, 
a second phase of the revolutionary process, i.e. counter-revolution, 
becomes inevitable. Its causes are identical with the factors which led to 
revolution, i.e. the repression of instincts. The society, after a series of loses, 
slowly comes back to normality. The most effective patterns of human 
interaction are restored thanks to the reconstruction of the old institutions, 
political system and state apparatus. 
Each of the abovementioned perspectives played an important role 
in the shaping of contemporary theory of revolutions. They were an 
inspiration, a reference point, and often a foundation for further reflection. 
For the theory of revolution they became cognitive patterns just like the 
ideas of Plato or Aristotle for philosophy. Some would even say that 
everything that was written after them can be only treated as a comment 
on their ideas. Obviously, these are not all classical theories but those most 
significant for our further thoughts. What should also be mentioned are 
the thoughts of the representatives of social and humanistic sciences such 
as: Max Weber, who focused on the revolutionary and post-revolutionary 
process; Vilfred Pareto – he incorporated a revolutionary turn into his 
theory of the circulation of elite; 
Edward Tiryakian – interpreted revolution as a religious revival; Emil 
Durkheimi – revolution, just like suicide, is a manifestation of social 
disorganisation.
The echo of the classical ideas, often criticised or defended, resonates in 
most of the further concepts and ideas. There is no doubt that theoretical 
thoughts of Marx, de Oliveira, Tocqueville, Le Bon or Sorokin would lay 
the foundation for further research areas.
1.4. research areas
If the 19th century is called the century of revolutionists, then the 20th 
century is the century of revolutions. Together with an increasing size of 
the empirical material, based on the classics of the theory of revolution, 
certain research areas appeared. Let us follow briefly the evolution of the 
major ideas.
The first important research area was the school of natural history 
of revolution. It developed in the 1920s in the United States of America 
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among historians, political scientists and sociologists inspired by the 
vision of the past as a natural development of life. It analysed revolution in 
terms of phases of its development, its determinants and conditions. The 
new approach was initiated by Lyford P. Edwards in 1927 by publishing 
a seminal book, Natural History of Revolution. Soon afterwards it was 
followed by Crane Brinton134 and George Pettee135. A characteristic of the 
natural school is the so-called etiological approach and understanding 
of revolution as a pathology or illness which infects a healthy organism. 
What is more, a revolutionary process is not treated by these researchers 
as an unexpected and violent phenomenon but rather as a slow, sequential 
social movement. Edwards wrote that ‘[…] revolution is similar to the 
elephant. The elephant breeds in the slowest way out of animals and 
revolution is the social movement that forms slowest’136. The idea was 
simple, clear and it established some general rules. Revolution was 
viewed as a positive phenomenon, necessary to return to normality, to 
heal the ailing country. Owing to the selective choice of evidence for the 
sake of theory, the ‘natural school’ was criticised by historians. Still, it 
was the dominating perspective of revolution research (especially among 
American sociologists) till the 1960s.
The 1960s abounded in various ideas and theories. Generally, the ideas 
emerging at that time were viewed as a modernising perspective. It was at 
that time that many research areas emerged, such as historical sociology, 
psychological theories, structuralism, most of them of a temporary 
character. The sources of the revival of the theoretical reflection should 
be sought in the pressure of new events of a revolutionary character (e.g. 
China of 1949, Cuba of 1959, Bolivia of 1962). The empirical material 
prompted the academic circles to act, who previously were at an impasse 
for years. Scholars started to look for the causes and nature of violence. 
Various theories were used to explain the phenomenon of revolution, from 
the area of psychology, political sciences, or sociology. The basis for all the 
concepts and ideas was the modernising paradigm as revolution was seen 
as a side effect of various phenomena, which led to social tensions. The 
dominating functional-structural theory, as proposed by Talcott Parsons, 
was the starting point for most of the sociological ideas, which were 
134 C. Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, New York 1938.
135 G. Pettee, The Process of Revolution, New York 1938.
136 ‘[…] rewolucja pod pewnym względem jest podobna do słonia. Słoń jest najwolniej 
rozmnażającym się ze wszystkich żyjących stworzeń, rewolucja także jest najwolniej 
formującym się ruchem społecznym’. After: J. Chodak, op. cit., p. 65 (footnote 2); Conf. 
L. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution, Chicago–London 1973, p. 16; See: idem, The 
Mechanics of Revolution, ‘St. Stephen’s College Bulletin’ 1923, 64, 2.
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considered as a side effect of modernisation resulting in imbalance and 
social tension. Psychological theories focused on the cognitive processes, 
turning of frustration into aggression137 and on cognitive dissonance. 
A representative example of the analysed perspective was Chalmers 
Johnson. His beliefs presented in Revolutionary Change were based on the 
idea of the social system by Parson. He assumed that four conditions need 
to be fulfilled for the system to survive: maintaining of patterns of action 
(socialisation); adaptation; goal reaching; integration and social control138. 
In this light there are three prerequisites for revolution to take place. 
The most important is imbalance in a given social system (upsetting of 
the so-called equilibrium), and the ineffectiveness of the groups deciding 
about the social state in its reformation. The appearance of an accelerator 
(the army support; revolutionary ideologies; revolutionary strategies) 
facilitates a revolutionary change139. A similar concept was proposed by 
Neil J. Smelser, for whom social equilibrium was the foundation of social 
functioning. The author of 
Theory of Collective Behavior understood revolution as a non-
institutionalised collective behaviour prompting to take action in order 
to channel tension. His definition is very broad, it contains movements 
oriented towards values and norms, and aiming at personal changes in 
the authorities140. Theories by Johnson and Smelser can be classified as 
sociological theories, even though psychological influences could be 
found in the latter.
Research areas based on a psychological inspiration are closely linked 
with influential and clear concepts proposed by Ted Gurr and James C. 
Davies. They gained popularity thanks to their simplicity and colloquial 
nature. The former introduced a concept of relative depravation141, i.e. 
a difference between one’s expectations and possibilities. In other words, 
it is a cognitively experienced discord between what one deserves and 
what is available. It concerns areas such as the fulfilment of needs, the 
awareness of which stimulates social groups to change their situation, to 
end their misery. Defining the experienced injustice is a first step towards 
raising social awareness, understanding of one’s position and changing 
137 The theory of frustration-aggression underscores the consequences of frustration, 
which is always aggression or aggressive behavior. 
138 Ch. Johnson, Revolutionary Change, London 1966, pp. 51–52.
139 Ibidem, pp. 103–104.
140 N. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, New York 1962, p. 319.
141 Relative deprivation is a term introduced by W.G. Runciman and describes 
a difference ‘between the desired situation and the available one’. See: W. Runciman, 
Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, California 1966, p. 10.
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the reality. Together with people’s awareness of ‘[…] what they really 
should have, and perception of the difference between what they should 
have and what they really can have, a relative depravation is born’142. 
Relative depravation as a variable explaining revolution is the essence 
of Gurr’s hypothesis. He mentions its types: diminishing – a decrease in 
the ability to fulfil one’s needs; aspiring – an increase in the expectations 
of realising one’s needs; progressive – a real improvement in realising 
one’s needs leads to the continuation of the trend143. The last type of 
depravation is closely linked to the hypothesis of the J-curve by James 
Davies. Aspirations and possibilities intensify for some time until the 
realisation of one’s needs becomes impossible. This results in the so-called 
‘revolution of the frustrated progress’144. ‘Revolution can take place at 
ease when an accordingly long period of economic and social growth is 
followed by a short period of sudden regress. What is most important in 
the first stage is the creation of a belief in the given society that there are 
possibilities to fulfil the inevitably growing demands, and in the second 
stage – a feeling of anxiety and discouragement, when the existing reality 
does not meet the expected reality’145. One cannot overlook the inspiration 
coming from Tocqueville’s ideas. Similarly to the French thinker, Davies 
states that contemplating a better world and throwing off the shackles, as 
well as experiencing the unknown creates a violent rejection of the burden 
through revolution. Davies’ model borrows from this idea, and its graphic 
representation takes the form of the J-curve.
The element of political sciences among the research areas which 
emerged in the 1960s can be clearly seen in the theory of political order 
in the changing society by Samuel P. Huntington. It was also inspired by 
functionalism, just like the ideas of a sociological character. Huntington 
offered a synthesis of this paradigm with the theories of social and 
economic mobility. The state of imbalance as proposed by the author of 
142 ‘[…] co tak naprawdę powinni mieć, i dostrzegą różnicę między tym, co powinni 
mieć i tym co faktycznie mogą mieć – wtedy dopiero rodzi się relatywna deprywacja’. P. 
Sztompka, Socjologia, p. 288.
143 T. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton 1970, pp. 46–52.
144 ‘rewolucji sfrustrowanego postępu’.
145 ‘Najłatwiej może dość do rewolucji w sytuacji – pisał Davies – gdy po odpowiednio 
długim okresie rozwoju ekonomicznego i społecznego następuje krótki okres gwałtownego 
regresu. W okresie pierwszym najważniejsze jest wytworzenie się w umysłach ludzi 
żyjących w danym społeczeństwie przekonania, że istnieją trwałe możliwości zaspokajania 
potrzeb, które nieustannie rosną, zaś w okresie drugim – poczucie niepokoju i zniechęcenia, 
gdy istniejąca rzeczywistość nie odpowiada rzeczywistości oczekiwanej’. J.C. Davies, 
Przyczynek do teorii rewolucji, in: Elementy teorii socjologicznych, eds. W. Dereczyński, A. 
Jasińska-Kania, J. Szacki, Warszawa 1975, p. 390.
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Political Order in Changing Societies stems from the discrepancy between 
political, social and economic modernisation, which in its extreme form 
leads to revolution. The inhibiting factors are high institutionalisation, or 
the existence of a social structure which is too traditional or too modern. 
Revolution is not a universal phenomenon, taking place in each phase of 
history. It is reduced to those societies which experienced belated social, 
economic or political processes146.
In contrast to such a narrow understanding of revolution, a theory 
proposed by Charles Tilly appeared. He claimed that revolution is not 
a special, extraordinary phenomenon but, to paraphrase General von 
Clausewitz, an extension of politics with a new means. Revolutions are 
radical forms of fighting for political power and control147. Tilly’s key 
contribution was to make a distinction between a revolutionary situation 
and results. Importantly, Tilly was one of the authors and promoters of the 
studies of revolution within the area of historical sociology in the 1960s and 
1970s. It should also be mentioned that the research developed by Shmuel N. 
Eisenstadt, Immanuel Wallerstein and Barrington Moore Jr. broke with the 
sociological paradigms connected with ahistorical functionalism directed 
at social statics148. Tilly’s ideas concerned a wide range of events and linked 
the major research perspectives of historical sociology. Tilly dealt with the 
creation of case studies and explanatory models connected with processes 
forming modern societies149. Generally, a historical approach in sociology 
postulates studying specific societies and individuals. Historical sociology 
deals with specific examples of revolutions (e.g. Tilly studied mostly the 
French Revolution). An inspiration for such studies were the Marxist 
ideas (mostly Wallerstein’s and Moore’s) and the historical approach of 
the Annales school. They led to the emergence of new school of the theory 
of revolution which continued the research strategy yet developed it in 
various directions.
Dennis Smith mentioned Tilly, next to Marc Bloch, Fernand Braudel 
and Barrington Moore, as representatives of the research approach called 
‘interrogating judge’, i.e. linking scientific objectivity with engagement 
in important social issues. One of such issues is revolution. Barrington 
Moore, the author of Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, shaped 
the following generations of revolution experts. Moore, for whom most 
146 Huntington made a distinction between two types of revolution: western and 
eastern. The criterion is the nature or regime against which a given revolution starts. 
147 See: C. Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, Reading 1978.
148 See: A. Kolasa-Nowak, Socjologia w badaniu przeszłości. Koncepcja socjologii historycznej 
Charlesa Tilly’ego, Lublin 2001, pp. 11–27.
149 Ibidem, p. 9.
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of the ideas are of the Marxist roots150, believed that a transformation 
of feudal societies into national states followed various paths and had 
various outcomes. The results of the change are democracy, fascism, and 
communism, achieved through different types of revolutions151. In order 
to explain the beginnings and consequences of modernisation processes, 
Moore mentions four variables: the power of bourgeois impulse; serfdom 
work or market; revolutionary potential of peasants152; the relationship 
between the state and various social classes. The case studies, which he 
analysed, were India (result: no revolution), China and Russia (peasants’ 
communist revolution), Germany and Japan (fascist revolution), France, 
England, the United States of America (bourgeois revolution). The theory 
by Moore did not concentrate only on revolution but also inspired other 
generations of thinkers, including Charles Tilly. Jeffery M. Paige noted: 
‘We are all students of Barrington Moore, not only Theda Skocpol or 
Charles Tilly, who had the privilege of carrying out studies with him, or 
Jack Goldstone or Jeff Goodwin [who also cooperated – author’s note] 
with one of his students [Theda Skocpol – author’s note] but also Victoria 
Bonell, Susan Eckstein and myself were greatly impressed by his work. He 
created modern studies on revolution and contributed to the golden age 
of historical-comparative sociology and revival of political sociology’153. 
Moore and his studies were ground-breaking for the theory of revolution 
and analysis of long-term processes.
Theda Skocpol, Moore’s colleague, is related to the innovative work, 
States and Social Revolution, marking a beginning in new methodology of 
studies over radical social changes. It focused on three major revolutions 
150 Barringtona Moore’s basic category is social class, and the ruling class wants to 
subordinate the subordinated class. 
151 B. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making 
of the Modern World, Boston 1966, pp. XIV–XVII.
152 Studies by Jeffery M. Paige, Eric R. Wolf and James Scott were based on the 
revolutionary potential of peasants. See: E.R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, 
New York 1969; J.M. Paige, Agrarian Revolution. Social Movements and Export Agriculture 
in the Underdeveloped World, New York 1975; J. Scott, The Moral Economy of Peasant, New 
Haven 1976.
153 ‘Wszyscy jesteśmy studentami Barringtona Moore’a, nie tylko Theda Skocpol czy 
Charles Tilly, którzy mieli przywilej prowadzenia z nim wspólnych badań, czy Jack 
Goldstone i Jeff Goodwin, [którzy współpracowali – author’s note] z jednym z jego 
studentów [Thedą Skocpol – author’s note], ale także Victoria Bonell, Susan Eckstein 
i ja sam znajdowaliśmy się pod głębokim wpływem jego pracy. Stworzył on nowoczesne 
studia nad rewolucją, podobnie jak przyczynił się do obecnego złotego wieku socjologii 
historyczno-porównawczej i odnowy socjologii polityki’. After: J. Chodak, op. cit., p. 152; 
Conf. J. Paige, The Social Origins of Dictatorship, Democracy and Socialist Revolution in Central 
America, ‘Journal of Developing Societies’ 1990, 6, 1, p. 37.
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in France, Russia, and China, where a radical change occurred in the 
early phase of modernisation. She compared these cases with the cases 
of modernisation processes where revolution did not take place, e.g. in 
Japan in the 1960s and Prussia at the beginning of the 19th century. The 
historical-comparative method serves as a tool of finding similarities and 
differences. The basis for Skocpol’s studies was the structuralist perspective, 
highlighting objective relationships and conflicts between groups and 
nations154 but not ‘[…] between interests, perspectives or ideologies of 
particular individuals active during revolution’155. To support her thesis, 
Skocpol quoted Erica Hobsbawm, who wrote that ‘[…] unquestionable 
significance of actors in a drama […] does not mean that they are also 
playwrights, producers or set designers’156. This approach was labelled 
as state-centered approach, which focuses on the state, an autonomous 
structure, organised to control its people and territory. The state has its 
own affairs, which are realised on an international stage. Hence one of 
the decisive variables are international relations or international pressure, 
caused by the unbalanced development of capitalism on a global scale 
and the emergence of national states. The guiding principle of the author 
of States and Social Revolution was: ‘[…] revolutions are not made, they 
come’157.
A typical feature of structural studies was to look for a decisive cause 
of revolution. According to Skocpol, it is international pressure. Others 
were of a different opinion. Jack A. Goldstone, in his work Revolution and 
Rebellion in the Early Modern World, raised a question of why certain crises 
happened on a global scale in particular periods of time. The explanation 
seems to be simple; it is all about population growth that influenced all the 
institutions of social life. For example, the demographic explosion of 1500–
1650 resulted in weakening of the state. It resulted in a surge in inflation, an 
increase in mobility, rivalry among the elites and caused a great mobility 
of the masses158. These factors stem from demographic ‘explosions’ and 
can be decisive when it comes to a crisis. It is a specific synthesis of the 
analysis of a demographic character and a causal model.
154 T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolution. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and 
China, Cambridge 1979, pp. 14–18.
155 ‘[…] interesami, perspektywami lub ideologiami poszczególnych aktywnych 
podczas rewolucji jednostek’. After: P. Sztompka, Socjologia, p. 290; Por. T. Skocpol, op. cit., 
p. 291.
156 ‘[…] niepodważalne znaczenie aktorów grających w dramacie […] nie oznacza, 
że są oni również dramaturgami, producentami czy scenografami’. After: ibidem; Por. T. 
Skocpol, op. cit., p. 18.
157 ‘[…] rewolucje nie są tworzone, one nadchodzą’. Ibidem, p. 17.
158 J.A. Goldstone, Revolutions, pp. 83–128. 
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The paradigm started by Moore evolved with time towards 
multidimensional studies together with new cases of revolution in Latin 
America, Third World and Eastern Europe. The authors such as Jeff 
Goodwin, John Foran, Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Farideh Farhi, Eric 
Selbin, John Walton, and Goldstone all belonged to ‘the Skocpol’s school’. 
They all presented their theoretical stance in a clear way, which, according 
to Krzysztof Brzechczyn, is a manifestation of cognitive development. 
A high quality of methodology helps to verify the assumptions and gives 
an opportunity to use them in future studies159.
The state-oriented model and international context proved to extremely 
flexible and subject to modification. However, this interesting way of 
explanation, on the grounds of structuralism, has its limitations. For 
instance, it is the exclusion of issues such as mentality, social mobility, 
or psychological grounds for taking action. The belief that revolution 
is made in specific structural conditions (e.g. a crisis, a war) and not as 
a consequence of an effort by mobilised groups, acting in the name of 
values and ideas, seems to be contrary to historical experience. An act 
of ignorance towards revolutionists, their interest, ideology, motivation 
leads to a biased view of a given revolution. The structural causes (e.g. 
international pressure or population growth) are not explanations from 
the point of view of the subjects who decide on the start of a revolution or 
participation in it.
The structural perspective found its counterbalance in studies inspired 
by the theory of rational choice. Micheal Tien-Lung Liu paraphrased 
Skocpol’s famous words when after the revolution in Iran in 1979 he said: 
‘Revolution was made, it did not come’160. The models of rational choice 
appeared as early as the 1970s. A source of inspiration was the theory of 
collective action by Mancur Olson. Looking back in the past of the rational 
choice theory, its foundations were laid by Adam Smith and David 
Hume. They tried to explain social phenomena by relying on theories of 
individual behaviour. Olson assumed that people act in a rational way. 
Rationality was understood as an action which aims at maximisation of 
the expected results161.
159 K. Brzechczyn, Polityka jako proces rewolucyjnej zmiany społecznej. Od Marksa do 
współczesnych teorii rewolucji w socjologii historyczno-porównawczej, in: Koncepcje polityki, ed. 
W. Wesołowski, Warszawa 2010, pp. 309–310.
160 ‘Rewolucja została zrobiona, ona nie nadeszła’. After: J. Chodak, op. cit., p. 153; Por. 
M. Tien-Lung Liu, Explaining the Revolutionary Outcomes in Iran and Poland, ‘Theory and 
Society’ 1988, 17, 2, p. 179.




On the basis of Olson’s theory, Gordon Tullock put forward a theory 
accounting for the participation of individuals in revolutionary activity. 
His work titled Paradox of Revolution, published in 1971, was a starting 
point for studies focusing on a logical explanation of motives for collective 
action. Tullock noted that a choice whether to participate in revolution 
or not is not made on the basis of the category of public goods. People 
expect individual rewards. The underestimating of gratification and 
punishment may be decisive for participation. Individuals make choices 
for their own good, out of three possibilities, i.e. joining revolutionists, 
supporting the authorities or being passive. Each of the possibilities 
is construed as a model162, which is characteristic of the construction of 
formal theories of a general nature. Morris Silver followed Tullock and 
defined a revolutionary act as ‘[…] extraordinary or (whether violent or 
not) taken by the agents in order to reach a change in the government 
composition, its structure or politics’163. What is more, it modified Tullock’s 
idea of highlighting the mental benefits of revolutionary activity.
Samuel L. Popkin customized the abovementioned theory to study 
specific revolutions. The topic of his study in Rational Peasant was the 
Vietnam revolution, and to be specific, the issue of peasants’ mobilisation. 
With the assumption of rational actions, Popkin reached a conclusion that 
the peasants in Vietnam decided to join the revolution only when they 
assessed that it would give them better life opportunities. It was the benefits 
offered by the sides of the conflict that influenced the peasants’ choices. It 
is exactly for that reason that the support for communists was conditioned 
by Marxism and Leninism. Selective motifs (the term borrowed from 
Olson), i.e. real and pragmatic rewards in the form of lessened workload 
tipped the scale for the Communist Party’s advantage164.
Popkin’s work appeared in 1979, at the same time as Skocpol’s work. 
They represented totally different perspectives of the study. On the one 
hand, individualism, on the other – methodological structuralism. In 
a wider context, it is a perennial dilemma of social sciences: the choice 
between an individual and structure. The two perspectives seemed to be 
162 The strategy of passivity is expressed in the formula Pin= Pg*Lv, where Pin is 
passivity, Pg is benefits from a change of the authorities, and Lv is the probability of 
a victory of revolutionists. See: G. Tullock, The Paradox of Revolution, ‘Public Choice’ 1971, 
11, pp. 87–100.
163 ‘[…] nadzwyczajny czy (z użyciem przemocy lub nie), podjętym przez aktora w celu 
osiągnięcia zmiany w składzie personalnym rządu, jego strukturze lub polityce’. After: J. 
Chodak, op. cit., p. 159; Conf. M. Silver, Political Revolution and Repression: An Economic 
Approach, ‘Public Choice’ 1974, 17, pp. 63–64.
164 S. Popkin, Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam, Berkeley 
1979, p. 262.
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irreconcilable165. Skocpol’s perspective won in general scientific circles, 
becoming a study paradigm. Contemporary multidimensional theories 
grew within the idea of focusing on the category of the state as a basic 
object of revolution studies.
The dichotomy between agency and structure became more considerable 
with time. The authors to come tried to bridge that gap166. The 1980s and 
1990s witnessed a synthesis of the two paradigms. Jeffrey Berejikian 
placed radical agents within the structural frame. He was aware of the 
limitations of the rational approach and relied on the prospect theory by 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. It is a link between the paradigms. 
According to Berejikian, the concept of the socio-structural frame is crucial 
to explaining revolutionary actions. Framing is one of the fundamental 
concepts in the prospect theory and it acknowledges the importance of 
prospect in decision making. The choice made by an individual is placed 
in their individual perspective of gains and losses. The conclusion is that 
structural explanations are necessary to account for the state’s receptivity 
to revolutionary changes and their potential results. A rational choice is the 
basis of collective action, which is a sum of individual choices167. Berejikian’s 
idea can be described as a theory of the structure of subject commitment168.
This borderline trend is still valid today169. The discussion between 
the advocates of two methodologies does not resemble ‘a dialogue of 
165 It was believed that a real ‘scientific’ study within sociology entails a construction of 
general theories rather than historical generalisations as proposed by historical sociology. 
Methodological mess was the major accusation made against the historical approach. The 
advocates of the model of rational choice were accused of impracticality and artificial 
objectivity. Nicolasa Olssona Yaouzisa noted a lack of consequence and the incompleteness 
of the model of rational choice. The assumption of revolutionists’ rationality implies 
rationality of despots. I agree with such a statement and believe that a solution to the 
problem may be the game theory applied to a given revolution. See: N. Olsson-Yaouzis, 
Revolutionaries, Despots and Rationality, ‘Rationality and Society’ 2010, 22, pp. 283–299.
166 Which was connected with other methodological dilemmas. 
167 See: J. Berejikian, Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent – Structure Problem, 
‘American Political Science Review’ 1992, 86, 3, pp. 647–657.
168 Similar ideas of breaking with the existing dichotomy were proposed by Micheal 
Taylor and Jack A. Goldstone. See: M. Taylor, Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action, 
in: Rationality and Revolution, ed. M. Taylor, Cambridge 1988; idem, Structure, Culture and 
Action in the Explanation of Social Change, ‘Politics and Society’ 1989, 17, 2, pp. 115–162; 
J.A. Goldstone, Is Revolution Individually Rational?: Groups and Individuals in Revolutionary 
Collective Action, ‘Rationality and Society’ 1994, 6, pp. 139–166.
169 A perfect example is Erica Selbin’s ideas. He claims that it is necessary to follow the 
thoughts and feelings of revolutionists. Storytelling should be used as a tool for understanding, 
which is a comeback of the narration to the methodology of social sciences. In myths, memory, 
and mimesis Selbin sees factors spurring people to take revolutionary actions. A story is an 
attempt to find the missing link in the studies on revolution. See: E. Selbin, Revolution, Rebellion.
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the dumb with the deaf’170. An interaction between rational action and 
structure seems to be obvious. A theoretical reflection over revolution 
produced ideas synthesising opposing perspectives (micro-mezzo-macro, 
subject-structure, locality-globalisation). An expression of such tendencies 
in social sciences are the models such as the game theory, prospect theory, 
the concept of becoming, structuration theory, world-systems theory, 
theory of network society, the concept of habitus. They are not limited to 
the tools of one discipline but rather integrate various methods and create 
the new ones. The theory of revolution has been a specific area for which 
new phenomena are a development factor. They generate new questions. 
Waves of revolution have an impact on theorising, and the timeliness 
of certain paradoxes behind revolutionary changes, dressed in different 
intellectual tendencies, provides a wealth of answers. The importance 
of revolution understanding, especially those ignored or not identified, 
is expressed by Martin Malia, claiming that ‘[…] the drama of a great 
revolution happens only once in the history of a given country. Its cause 
is not a metaphysical historical imperative but the down-to-earth fact that 
in each country there is only one old order that the society tries to handle, 
and once it manages to or even tries, the epoch-making, irreversible event 
is over. The features of the revolution, the historical moment at the time of 
its outbreak, its course and direct consequences, all have an effect or even 
determine the future history of a given country, its politics, mythology, 
and the way it reacts to changes’171.
(translated by Konrad Żyśko)
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streszczeNie
Głównym celem artykułu jest analiza historii pojęcia rewolucji i zmian w ramach 
teorii rewolucji. Teoretyzowanie na temat radykalnych zmian społecznych od początku 
napotykało podstawowe problemy związane z omawianym zjawiskiem. Szereg pytań nie 
znalazło ‘ostatecznej’ odpowiedzi: Czym rewolucja różni się od innych zmian społecz-
nych? Czy rewolucja ma początek i koniec? Czy rewolucja jest skutkiem przypadku czy 
konieczności? Dlaczego do rewolucji dochodzi w tym czasie i na tej przestrzeni? Jak re-
wolucja ewoluuje? Te podstawowe problemy wciąż są przedmiotem refleksji teoretyków 
rewolucji. Celem tego artykułu jest zaś wskazanie relacji między historią a teoriami rewo-
lucji, jak i historią samej teorii.
Słowa kluczowe: rewolucja, zmiana społeczna, teoria, historia, przeszłość
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